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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question of whether the putative group right of collective self-
determination can be invoked to justify the state’s presumed right to exclude foreigners 
from its territory. This form of argument represents a growing trend in the literature on 
exclusion. Such arguments are potentially extremely powerful, as, if successful, they 
would vindicate a right to exclude largely at the discretion of the receiver state, rather 
than a right limited to certain cases. It is here argued that theorists who share certain 
commitments – here referred to as “liberal individualists” - cannot consistently defend 
a discretionary right to exclude through this approach. The argument proceeds by way 
of three “case studies”. First, it is shown that the right to collective self-determination 
cannot be justified as an extension of individual autonomy. Recognising this, theorists 
with broadly individualist commitments defend the group right to self-determination on 
the basis of some irreducibly collective value it is said to serve – collective property, and 
collective freedom of association. Yet it is here argued these theorists are unsuccessful, 
as a result of their inability to square an irreducibly collective value with their 
individualistic commitments. It is then suggested that the nature of democratic 
institutions may be able to explain why we ought to respect group rights accorded to 
states in the same way we respect the autonomy of individuals. It is argued, however, 
that no realistically achievable system of democracy would be capable of furnishing such 
an explanation. An assessment of the reasons these three forms of argument fail 
provides evidence for a more definite claim: any defence of a right to collective self-
determination that could justify a discretionary right to exclude must involve the 
wholesale rejection of moral individualism, the thesis that there are no intrinsically 
collective goods.  
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1. Introduction: The Right to Exclude 
Why do states have the right to determine whether foreigners may enter their territory? 
This question is likely to seem frivolous to the average person. States just are entities 
which have that right, and so long as there are states, there will be border controls. Yet 
it is worth remembering that the system of border controls we encounter today is a 
recent phenomenon. Passports, for example, only became a requirement for travel in 
Europe during the First World War. Prior to this, governments may have issued letters 
to allow travellers to prove their identity and their business abroad, but the mere 
presence of a foreigner in a strange country without that country’s permission would not 
automatically have been regarded as criminal behaviour. Certainly, immigrants were 
liable to be suspected of espionage or some other dark purpose, and may have been 
sanctioned as a result, but the concept of “illegal immigration” had yet to be invented. 
Today, when the issue of immigration makes newspaper headlines virtually every day, 
it is easy to forget that border controls are essentially a piece of government policy, 
introduced for specific reasons, and not simply a timeless fact of life.  
Immanuel Kant, in his essay on Perpetual Peace, called ‘universal hospitality’ a 
‘cosmopolitan right’, a right held by all individuals regardless of the state to which they 
belong. This granted travellers protection against being ‘treated with hostility’, although 
Kant writes that the would-be migrant ‘can be turned away’. This right to hospitality was 
said to derive from our ‘communal possession of the earth’s surface’, according to which 
‘no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy a particular portion 
of the globe’ (Kant 1991 105-6). It is not clear exactly how far this article of right goes: 
Kant suggests that hospitality requires that receiver states are hospitable enough to 
ensure that it is possible for them to enter into peaceful relations that may eventually be 
regulated by public law. Given that the age during which Europe discovered the rest of 
the world is now over, and most countries are able to enter into diplomatic relations in 
some form or another, whether or not their citizens are able easily to visit each other, 
perhaps Kantian hospitality is not as far-reaching as it may first appear. Yet it is clear that 
Kant saw the freedom to move across the earth as the rightful condition of humankind, 
and a lack of cosmopolitan hospitality as an unfortunate product of the contemporary 
system of international lawlessness which would be eliminated as we moved closer to 
achieving his pacific federation. 
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In the English-speaking world it is scarcely possible to discuss the issue of immigration 
from a philosophical standpoint without mentioning the work of Joseph Carens. His 
1987 argument for open borders stated what may have seemed an outlandish position 
in precisely the terms needed for the contemporary philosophical establishment to take 
his case seriously – Rawlsian, Nozickean and Utilitarian – and turned justifying the state’s 
right to exclude, as well denying it, into subjects of mainstream philosophical activity. 
Carens emphasises, both in the 1987 paper and his recent book (Carens 2013), the 
Kant-inspired view that free movement should be considered a right, and that it is states 
which must justify their case for excluding migrants, not migrants who must justify their 
case to be admitted into states. For the purposes of this thesis, I follow both Kant and 
Carens by beginning from a presumption in favour of the freedom to move across 
borders. The subject of this chapter is thus the right to exclude, and not the right to 
immigrate. My aim is not, however, to defend the view that open borders should be 
adopted as policy; I merely wish to critique a certain form of argument in favour of the 
right to exclude.   
In this chapter I shall focus on three approaches to the justification of the right to 
exclude: i) the realist defence, ii) the jurisdiction defence and iii) the self-determination 
defence. The aim is to demonstrate the merits of the self-determination defence from 
the perspective of liberal individualist political theory. This latter approach is attractive 
for those who wish to defend the presently predominant convention, in short, because 
if successful, it would allow them to defend states’ claim to a discretionary right to 
exclude: the right to pick and choose immigrants according to criteria of their own 
devising. Moreover, it would do so for reasons acceptable within the dominant 
framework of liberal individualist political thought. The idea of collective autonomy is 
a powerful one. Autonomy is often held up as the primary value of the liberal ideology, 
and it is from this value that an entire system of individual rights and responsibilities is 
widely thought to derive. If groups of individuals, or institutions such as states, can be 
said to be autonomous in the same way, this would provide a robust justification for 
their rights. I do not believe that such a defence is in fact possible, and this thesis will go 
on to demonstrate the limitations of such forms of argument. 
The realist defence 
In the public discourse of the English-speaking world, the most prevalent argument 
against immigration (which is not the same as an argument against the right to immigrate) 
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is that immigration makes it more difficult for the “indigenous” population to find 
employment, and that it drives down wages at the lower end of the income scale. The 
typical response to such views is that, on the contrary, immigration is good for the 
economy; it helps businesses to create wealth and thus to create jobs. The assumption 
behind this debate is that immigration is purely a question for domestic policy to 
address. We set the rate of immigration in just the same way that we set the rate of 
taxation: by balancing, as far as possible, the various competing interests within our 
society. The interests of those outside our society, the very people who will be the 
primary subjects of immigration policy, do not enter into consideration except as means 
to our enrichment or objects of our distrust. This picture, insofar as it is accurately 
represents contemporary discourse, suggests that certain realist assumptions underpin 
policy-making on immigration.  
Realism in international relations is a family of views which share in common the idea 
that states are best regarded as entities entirely concerned with their own national 
interest, and which play down the role of ethical norms in dealings between states and 
external actors. It was an ideology that enjoyed a long period of prominence in 
International Relations Theory, especially in the United States, beginning as a 
reactionary movement against the internationalism that was perceived to have failed in 
the outbreak of the Second World War, and continuing as a major current into the 
1980s, where it saw a resurgence through the ‘neorealism’ of Kenneth Waltz. Realists 
tend to cite Thomas Hobbes as the father of their position. Hobbes took the view that 
individuals who did not live under a sovereign power were, as a result of their physical 
equality and their psychological propensity to seek advantage for themselves, necessarily 
in a state of war, and thus had ‘a Right to every thing’, a right do whatever they judged 
necessary for their own survival. Sovereigns, in turn, have no higher authority in their 
dealings with other sovereigns, and thus were equally in a state of war on the Hobbesian 
account. The strong conclusion Hobbes drew, arguably the most radical interpretation 
of the realist view, was ‘where no Law, no Injustice’ (Hobbes 1996 90-3): outside the 
authority of a sovereign, our domestic norms of political morality simply do not exist, as 
they are constructed by the power of the sovereign. Thus the sovereign would be entitled 
to treat foreigners in any manner he saw fit, which would of course include exclusion 
from the territory. The Hobbesian sovereign’s condition of perfect right thus gave him 
full discretion over whom he allowed to gain entry into the territory. 
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The problem with this thesis is it requires one to hold a system of morality that is 
incongruous with the very core of our shared contemporary values. It is beyond the 
scope of the present project to explore the metatheory of politics and ethics, but suffice 
it to say that values thought of as “liberal” are so deeply implicated in our everyday moral 
thought that it would scarcely be possible for people like us to enter into productive 
discourse with anyone who believed he had no moral duties towards anyone outside of 
his own society or towards anyone designated an enemy of the state. This problem is 
explored with great sophistication in the later work of Bernard Williams. Williams 
endorses the Hobbesian, realist claim that the “first political question” should be ‘the 
securing of order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of cooperation’ (Williams 
2007 3), and condemns ‘political moralism’, the idea that political theory works out a 
system of ethical principles, and politics puts them into practice. He would doubtless 
thus come down on the side of realism rather than what might be called naïve 
cosmopolitanism in immigration debates (as opposed to a cosmopolitanism that limits 
its scope to liberal societies). It is simply pointless, he may have argued, to insist that all 
people are moral equals and thus have equal right to reside anywhere on earth, given 
that different societies exhibit a wide range of moral outlooks, many of which are 
dominated by values like allegiance and social trust. 
Yet even Williams does not think that the story stops with Hobbes. The first political 
question requires not just a solution, but an ‘acceptable’ solution. Liberalism, notably in 
the person of Kant, advanced on the Hobbesian thesis, arguing that even if the state of 
nature is a state in which individuals may do anything they judge necessary for their 
preservation, once sovereignty is established, we enter a new condition, a status iuridicus, 
in which our moral sense can come to fruition. Even if we believe that the moral sphere 
is an outgrowth of political activity, carried out through particular institutions, we cannot 
then switch off our ethical norms when we turn our gaze outside of our own society. For 
Williams an acceptable answer to the ‘first question’, so long as we are liberals, will 
involve conditions on the ways in which states are allowed to treat strangers and enemies. 
History happens to have turned out such that “we” do in fact share a “liberal” outlook 
(where “liberal” is understood in the broadest sense and not as any comprehensive 
doctrine, and “we” can essentially mean whatever we take it mean, but at the very least 
stands for the sort of people reading books on political theory in English). That persons 
are worthy of respect, that their interests matter, simply because they are persons, is a 
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core feature of the prevailing morality, and one from which we cannot easily distance 
ourselves without losing part of our modern identity. Thus for us the extreme 
interpretation of Hobbes – that we can do no injustice in our dealings with foreigners –
should be regarded as belonging to a bygone era, and cannot be treated as an acceptable 
position. ‘There is no route back from reflectiveness’, as Williams puts the point 
elsewhere (Williams 2006 163). I do not believe Williams’ own version of realism has 
determinate implications for the right to exclude: certainly we would not have the 
resources to criticise the exclusionary policies of illiberal societies on this account, but 
there is room for an internal debate within liberalism regarding whether exclusion is 
compatible with liberal principles.   
Contemporary realists offer a more ‘acceptable’ approach. John Mearscheimer has 
argued that the duty of states to secure the safety of their citizens (the first political 
question), is simply impossible to fulfil without adopting an aggressive stance against 
foreign powers and nationals, and striking first to achieve every possible advantage. ‘The 
structure of the international system’ he argues, ‘forces states, which seek only to be 
secure nonetheless to act aggressively towards each other’ (Mearscheimer 2001 3). This 
is, in a sense, a moralistic form of realism, in that it attempts to justify realpolitik in 
international relations to the liberal mainstream, through premises Mearscheimer 
believes they ought to be able to accept. If we take the Hobbesian analogy between the 
state of nature and the international situation seriously, states ought to seek every 
advantage, because it is the only way to secure themselves against other states seeking to 
do the same. To implement this view in defence of a full, discretionary right to exclude 
would be to argue that without the authority to prevent foreign nationals from entering 
the territory without justification, it would be impossible for the state adequately to 
respond to the ‘first political question’. This now becomes a problem for empirical 
public policy and sociology. But the view does not seem particularly plausible. Even if 
borders are porous enough that various outsiders who wish to do harm to citizens are 
able to enter, the danger is not an existential one; it is not the case that the state 
necessarily ought to adopt a general policy of “exclude first, ask questions later” on pain 
of failing adequately to protect the security of its citizens. Security may provide a valid 
reason for exclusion on a case by case basis, but it does not give the liberal state a free 
hand to exclude whomsoever it likes without justification. The threat to security is simply 
not so grave that it cannot be managed in a way that respects the interests of would-be 
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immigrants, through for example, targeted policing rather than blanket suspicion. After 
all, the state would be able to protect the security of its citizens more effectively if it 
imposed nightly curfews and employed a secret police force to monitor citizens’ every 
move. But this would be too great a cost in terms of the other values contemporary 
liberals take to be necessary conditions for the state to answer the ‘first political 
question’. Many liberals would take a similar view of a discretionary right to exclude – 
in any case, that is the debate that needs to be had. Mearsheimer has thus failed to 
provide a case which both bypasses the debate surrounding the right to exclude as a 
problem within liberalism, and is cogent from a liberal perspective.  
The jurisdiction defence 
It has been argued that states must have the right to exclude because states are essentially 
entities that assert jurisdiction over territory. This assertion is potentially question-
begging. Simply to claim that states have the right to exclude because it is in their nature 
is no argument at all, since it presupposes this nature, as presently conceived, is good. If 
it is in the nature of states to have the right to exclude, but this right is determinately not 
a right they ought to have, then we might equally conclude that states ought to be 
replaced by something other than states, perhaps like states in every respect apart from 
their possession of this right. One way of avoiding circularity is therefore to argue that 
some good feature of the state is dependent on its ability to exclude. 
Michael Blake (2013, 2014) takes a different approach. He describes his method in the 
following way: 
I take for granted that states exist, and that they have certain characteristics without which 
we would not describe them as states — but not, of course, that they have any right to 
exclude. I want then to ask what, in these characteristics, might be invoked as the ground 
for a collective right to refuse would-be immigrants. (Blake 2013 109) 
It may appear from this description that he makes exactly the mistake just described. 
Yet he does not, since he does not derive his conclusion from the idea of the state, but 
from the obligations we have when living under states. It remains open to a detractor to 
claim that the state should not exist – the argument is simply that so long as states exist, 
they have the right to exclude. He takes it to be a virtue of the approach that it does not 
rely upon asserting any particular good that is served by exclusion, as it is always possible 
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to deny that our interest, as citizens, in that good is not important enough to generate a 
right. Blake’s argument can be summarised as follows: 
1. The state’s territory marks out a jurisdiction within which its laws are effective 
2. If an immigrant crosses into the territory, she puts its inhabitants under an 
obligation to extend legal protection to that immigrant’s basic rights 
3. Individuals have the presumptive right not to be placed under an obligation 
without their consent 
4. Therefore the current inhabitants have the right to prevent the immigrant from 
placing them under this obligation, by preventing her from entering the territory.  
The first premise is uncontroversial, it is merely descriptive and therefore does not 
threaten any circularity. The second premise is supposed to follow from the first. The 
third premise is a principle posited by Blake, for which he admits he ‘cannot provide an 
adequate justification’ (Blake 2013 115). While we are often placed under obligations 
without our consent, this is because, on Blake’s view, they arise from other standing 
obligations. Obligations are limits on our freedom; they prevent us from doing whatever 
we would do in absence of the obligation. Blake believes it should strike liberal readers 
as plausible that freedom ought not to be curtailed without warrant. The conclusion then 
follows directly from the second and third premises. The argument has several merits. 
Blake’s observation that the state is a ‘territorial and legal community’ (Blake 2013 104) 
is a powerful one, because it provides an answer to the cosmopolitan challenge: if we 
accept the Kantian idea that no one has a greater claim to occupy any portion of the 
globe than anyone else, why should borders – these borders – have moral significance? 
The state has the right to defend precisely its actual borders, Blake argues, because it is 
precisely these borders that demarcate the extent of its jurisdiction. The extent of that 
jurisdiction may well have been smaller or larger if history had gone differently, but it is 
the very existence of lines separating one jurisdiction from another that is salient on this 
account. It also provides a reason for excluding immigrants that the immigrant herself 
ought to be able to accept, and thus is much more appealing from a liberal individualist 
standpoint than the “might-makes-right” realist position. 
The first thing to note is that this argument does not justify a full discretionary right to 
exclude. We do not have an unqualified right to prevent others from placing us under 
obligations, but rather a presumptive right. Thus, competing claims have to be taken 
into consideration. If a would-be migrant’s rights were inadequately protected in the 
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donor state, the citizens of the receiver state would not be able to complain that the 
migrant was imposing obligations upon them, as the migrant would have a standing claim 
to have her rights protected, which the receiver state would have a duty to uphold. This 
would mean refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention
1
 would certainly be exempt 
from exclusion, as would, plausibly, citizens of countries rendered unsafe due to war, 
and citizens of states whose institutions are too weak to be relied upon to uphold their 
human rights. Blake acknowledges the theory is ‘unable to defend the right of the 
government to exclude would-be immigrants from much of the world’, and thus defends 
‘rather a weak’ (Blake 2014 533) conception of the right to exclude. 
Blake clearly regards the third premise as the most controversial and spends the bulk of 
his 2013 paper defending it. I do not wish to challenge it, but I do believe it stands in 
need of clarification. When Blake claims we have a right not to be placed under 
obligations without our consent, what kind of right is it? In Hohfeldian terms, should 
we regard it as a claim, or merely a privilege? In other words, are others under a duty to 
ensure I am not placed under new obligations without my consent, or are they merely 
under a duty to avoid placing obligations on me if possible? It must be the latter. Blake’s 
argument is that ‘someone who imposes an obligation on me is…impinging on my 
freedom’ (Blake 2013 115, emphasis added), and thus they have no right to enter the 
state’s territory without consent. Here we clearly see the Hohfeldian jural correlatives, 
“freedom/privilege” and “no right”. To have a privilege to do something is to have no 
duty not to do that thing. This is our situation in Blake’s case: because the immigrant’s 
rights are adequately protected elsewhere, I simply have no duty to take on the obligation 
of protecting her. We may question, therefore, why some third party, the state, has the 
right to intervene – violently, as Carens reminds us2 – to defend my privilege.  
Privileges in the law can be viewed as the space of legitimate action left “between” 
particular prohibitions. Given that the state can enforce those prohibitions, one might 
think that the state does in a sense enforce privileges. Yet those prohibitions must be 
couched in terms of claim-right violations. I have the privilege to whistle outdoors in a 
                                                 
1 ‘Any person who… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’, 189 UNTS 137/ 
[1954] ATS 5, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/refugees.pdf, 
retrieved 9 August 2016 
2 ‘Borders have guards and the guards have guns’, Carens 1987 251 
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public place. If you accost me and threaten me with violence if I do not desist, the state 
might charge you with harassment or some other offense: harassment law can be seen 
as a protection of my claim-right not to be threatened when going about my legitimate 
business. It could not, however, punish you simply for denying my freedom to whistle 
in public. Thus we cannot say that the state, as lawgiver, may enforce individuals’ 
privilege not to have obligations placed upon them, because we would have to show 
there were enforceable claim-rights which would have the effect of creating the space for 
this privilege. Yet the obvious candidate – the right to exclude – is exactly what we are 
trying to justify. 
The problem I wish to focus on is this: the transition from Blake’s first to his second 
premise is essentially a non sequitur. It assumes that it is we, the inhabitants of the state, 
who are under an obligation to make the state’s laws effective. Clearly this is true to a 
certain extent: we are obliged to obey the law, and thus to make it effective. But this is a 
passive obligation, to ‘respect’ the law, and not an active obligation, to ‘protect’ and 
‘fulfil’ the law (I follow Blake in invoking this three-part formula). Our passive obligation 
simply to refrain from breaking the law does not seem to change with the number of 
people who enter the territory. Rather, it is the supposed obligations to ‘protect’ and 
‘fulfil’ the law in which Blake is interested. We are obliged, as citizens of the state, to 
create and sustain institutions that will protect and fulfil the rights of anyone who enters 
the territory. To whom, however, is this obligation owed? There can only be two 
plausible options: either we owe it to the state, or we owe it to each other. To my mind, 
the first of these looks immediately the more plausible. We are obliged by law, on pain 
of punishment, to pay taxes, and to participate in certain official capacities (for example 
as jurors) in order that the state can meet its obligation to protect and fulfil human rights 
within the territory under its jurisdiction. If this view is correct, then on entering the 
territory, it is not the case that the immigrant imposes an obligation upon me, but rather, 
she imposes it upon the state, and the state imposes a corresponding obligation upon 
me to pay taxes and contribute in official capacities, now to a greater extent. Thus, as I 
am not the patient of the immigrant’s imposition, nor may I be the agent of retaliation 
to defend my privilege.  
The state, however, is the patient of the immigrant’s action. Thus it may seem easy to 
claim that the state ought to be able to assert its freedom in this regard. Yet we must be 
careful: the state is not an individual. Should we regard it as having a privilege-right not 
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to have obligations imposed upon it? If we are Hobbesians, the answer is surely yes: for 
Hobbes the state’s privilege is unlimited, it has a right to everything. Yet for liberals such 
as Blake, this would be question-begging. If we accept some premise to the effect that 
rights can only be justified through reference to individuals – either to their special status 
as autonomous beings, or their interests – then it becomes more difficult to assert that 
the state has such a privilege. We may try to argue that the obligations that are imposed 
on individuals as an indirect result of the immigrant entering the territory can ground 
the state’s right to exclude instrumentally. Respecting a group right, we might argue, 
serves the good of ensuring individuals do not incur such obligations. Yet this cannot be 
argued from the perspective of rights-based morality, as the state is supposed to be 
entitled, by virtue of its status as protector of rights, to impose obligations on its citizens, 
thus they have no particular complaint. And from the perspective of interest-based 
morality, it is not the case that the costs imposed on individuals, in terms of higher taxes 
and perhaps a loss of leisure time due to public service are of sufficient importance to 
justify the state’s right to exclude instrumentally. The would-be immigrants will doubtless 
incur similar costs as a result of their exclusion. Furthermore, as Blake notes, the 
immigrant may ‘actually be a financial blessing’ (Blake 2013 115) to the receiver state. 
This would have to be weighed in a balance of competing claims, and it is unlikely the 
claims of denizens would be sufficiently strong. 
We may however, take the view that citizens have obligations to each other to ensure 
that rights are adequately protected on the state’s territory. It is a widely accepted liberal 
premise, handed down from Kant, that individuals have an obligation to associate with 
one another, in order to form a state capable of defending their rights, and thus, we 
might think that by extension, the state’s duty to protect and fulfil rights in its territory is 
actually in some way derivative from the duty of individuals. I am sceptical of this claim. 
We can accept that in theory, individuals in an extra-judicial condition would be obliged 
to found a state in order to protect their rights, but deny that in the condition in which 
we actually find ourselves, this duty is in some sense active, behind the scenes. Once a 
state is created, it exists as a corporate entity, distinct from its individual citizens, with 
powers and obligations independent of them. Historically, rights protections are 
concessions won from the state by the people. We can regard them as owed to citizens 
because of the state’s status as dominator, rather than deriving the state’s duty from the 
obligations of individual citizens in an imaginary pre-political condition.  
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If the state is required to defend rights in order to justify its power, one might argue that 
if the state failed to defend the rights of immigrants, it would be rendered illegitimate. 
On some views, this would have the further corollary that the people on its territory 
would be compelled to found a new state. In that sense, the people’s ‘latent sovereignty’ 
(see Grimm 2015 67-77) would arguably mean immigration really did put them under 
an additional obligation, the obligation to found a new state that will uphold the rights 
of those immigrants should the state fail to protect their rights. Yet this argument faces 
a form of “boundary problem”: the state having being declared illegitimate, who is to 
say what constitutes the political community upon that territory? In Kant’s imaginary 
pre-political condition, it is not the case that individuals are required to form a single 
state. They could, if they chose, form several states, freely determining their 
membership as voluntary associations. Similarly, only the existing state marks out the 
boundary of Blake’s ‘territorial and legal community’. As he is deliberately silent when 
it comes to pre-political criteria of group membership, wishing to avoid grounding the 
right to exclude in an ascriptive account of nationality, the theoretical dissolution of the 
state would mean the dissolution of the polity. We cannot, therefore, say that obligations 
of this kind are imposed on any particular individuals, thus no one has a justified 
complaint.  
In any case, the more fundamental point is this: if it is citizens who have obligations 
imposed upon them directly by immigrants, Blake has given us no reason why it should 
be the state that has the right to exclude. As a third party entity, it has no duty to enforce 
privileges, and thus any harm done to immigrants in the course of defending the 
privilege would be unjustified. 
The self-determination defence 
The realist defence had the advantage of purportedly being able to justify the kind of 
discretionary right to exclude that most modern states actually enjoy. The state is 
regarded as Hobbes’ individual in the state of nature, who possesses the right to ‘seek, 
and use, all helps and advantages of Warre’ (Hobbes 1996 92) against all those outside 
its bounds. This fits well with attitudes about the importance of security which, worrying, 
are becoming increasingly prevalent at the time of writing, and which might be called 
the “fortress” approach to border controls. The problem with this view is that it is 
anathema to the core of prevailing morality. Individuals have moral rights in the face of 
states. Liberals tend to reject the thesis of international anarchy in favour of the 
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international human rights tradition. States do not enjoy the right to do anything they 
judge necessary for their survival. We only value the interests of states because they 
ultimately serve the interests of their individual citizens, and the survival of a given state 
may not be in the interest of its citizens if that state is extremely bad at defending their 
rights. Furthermore, there have to be some objective constraints on what counts as a 
reasonable judgement of necessity, which also take account of the competing claims of 
individuals outside the state. 
In contrast, the jurisdiction view does (in theory at least) pay adequate attention to the 
rights of individuals; it functions by asserting a right not to be placed under unwarranted 
obligations, and squares this right against the interests immigrants have in entering the 
territory. Thus individual migrants are invited to accept that their claim to enter is not 
as strong as they thought. It is therefore eminently acceptable from a liberal individualist 
perspective. Its faults are that it can only justify a very limited right to exclude and that, 
as stated, it suffers from an explanatory gap between the assertion that states have certain 
rights and duties, and the assertion that individuals have them. In order to endow the 
state with the same kind of moral status that it has in the realist tradition, the view suggests 
that the state is the collective endeavour of individuals. When a state enacts an 
exclusionary policy, it seems Blake thinks of this as individuals collectively asserting their 
right not to be placed under new obligations. Yet he needs to say more about why the 
state should have the right to be the agent defending individuals’ supposed rights in this 
way. 
The self-determination view can be seen as a remedy against the failings of both these 
approaches. It asserts precisely the collective autonomy that seems to be an assumption 
of the jurisdiction view, thus giving the state the same kind of moral personality it has 
under realism, while remaining within a liberal individualist framework. If such a form 
of argument could be successful, it would be capable of justifying a system of 
exclusionary policies that were very close indeed to the status quo. To friends of the 
status quo, it is thus an extremely attractive view. To its enemies, it is the view most 
urgently in need of being debunked. The idea of collective self-determination is one that 
plays a key role in the history of international morality, and features prominently in the 
founding documents of the international human rights tradition. Yet it is a difficult 
concept to pin down, and is employed in markedly different ways by different theorists 
in different contexts. Allen Buchanan defines self-determination as ‘the making and 
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implementation of significant decisions concerning the political life of the group that can 
be attributed to the group’ (Buchanan 2016 450). On this definition, then (which I do 
not mean to assert should be considered canonical at this stage), to state that a group 
had a right to self-determination would be to assert its right to make political decisions 
for itself. Arguments for the right to exclude made on the basis of a right to self-
determination take many forms, but the basic claim goes something like this: if a group 
has the right to make political decisions for itself, a key area of competence must be its 
ability to make decisions about the composition of the group that constitutes the ‘self’. 
The group thus has the right to control membership, which given certain assumptions 
about the link between membership and territorial presence, would provide a case for 
a discretionary right to exclude: it provides a justification for the group’s power to choose 
whom it wishes to admit.  
The idea of collective self-determination is a feature of international morality which 
developed principally in the context of national liberation struggles in the face of 
imperialism. There has been some debate among both jurists and political theorists 
whether the right ought to apply only in cases of decolonisation, or whether it could also 
justify a right to succeed for sub-state groups of other kinds. In the 1990s, several authors 
developed normative theories of self-determination in the context of secession, a 
reflection, perhaps, of the key challenges facing the international community at that 
time: the conflicts ensuing from the breakup of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
Several of these theorists, most notably David Miller and Christopher Heath Wellman, 
have more recently gone on to apply their theories of self-determination to the debate 
surrounding immigration - arguably the most pressing political question of the present 
era. This thesis will thus return to the earlier question: what justifies the right to collective 
self-determination itself? In doing so, it will be necessary to clarify the concept of 
collective self-determination. The concept, as applied from the perspective of liberal 
individualism, faces certain determinate limitations. These limitations mean that it 
cannot legitimately be invoked to justify the right to exclude in the way many liberal 
individualist theorists might hope. Or so the thesis will argue.   
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2. The Right to Collective Self-Determination 
The idea of a right to collective self-determination has a specific history. This could be 
said of all putative rights, but unlike, for example, the idea of a right to property, its 
emergence is recent, and its relationship to material circumstances is quite manifest. 
Although it came to be recognised as a principle of customary international law at an 
earlier time, a key moment in its development was the international community’s 
recognition, in the decade following the Second World War, of the importance of 
facilitating the process of decolonisation. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted for signature by the 
UN General Assembly in 1966, declares a right to self-determination in the following 
terms: 
All peoples have a right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
This document and its companion, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, thus gave it the status of a human right. Unlike the other rights 
declared in the founding documents of the international human rights tradition, 
however, it was not ascribed to individuals, but only to a certain kind of group: 
“peoples”. The proper site, scope and content of the right remain a matter of some 
debate among jurists, with Antonio Cassese observing that ‘the principle neither points 
to the various specific areas to which the law should apply, nor to the final goal of self-
determination’ (Cassese 1995 320). 
This is not, however, a thesis in international legal theory, but in political philosophy. 
What, if anything, could justify the assertion of a moral right to collective self-
determination? Allen Buchanan believes that no such positive justification can be given; 
there is no prima facie right, but only a remedial right in the face of injustice (Buchanan 
1997). He is among a number of scholars, both philosophers and lawyers, who believe 
that the good embodied by a stable international order, protected against the threat of 
“balkanisation”, outweighs any good that might be achieved by acknowledging a right to 
self-determination. I do not wish to address this argument here, however: I will not take 
up the task of demonstrating that there is a positive right to self-determination. The 
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interest of the present project lies rather in addressing a particular form of argument 
advanced in favour of a right to collective self-determination.  
Indeed I do not wish to begin by defending my own view on the proper site, scope and 
content of the putative right to self-determination, beyond what is necessary to define 
the subject area, as will be seen in what follows. Rather, my argument will take place at 
a more abstract level of analysis. My aim is to examine the limitations of a particular 
kind of justificatory approach. My claim is that when a justification for the right to 
exclude on the basis of a right to self-determination is advanced by theorists who share 
certain common commitments – which I will refer to simply as “liberal individualism” 
– the justification requires a conception of self-determination so demanding that is not 
instantiated by any contemporary state, nor could it be with foreseeable institutional 
reforms. Thus such theorists cannot legitimately invoke the right of self-determination 
in defence of the exclusionary policies of extant states, as such states would first have to 
enjoy self-determination in the given sense before immigration could be considered a 
threat to it.  
Methodology and definitions 
Site 
Historically, collective self-determination has been invoked in three principal contexts: 
1. Ethnic-national independence: the principle that state borders should follow the 
distribution of ethnicities in that territory. This conception was applied in the 
break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires precipitated by the 
First World War, and was championed by US President Woodrow Wilson, 
whose Fourteen Points speech contained several references to the adjustment of 
borders along ‘lines of nationality’. After the Second World War, the principle 
of self-determination came to be applied almost exclusively to decolonisation. 
But during the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the end of the 
twentieth century, the ethnic-national principle re-emerged, to lend legitimacy to 
independence struggles in the many regions of these former states that professed 
their own national identities. Yet contemporary international law is generally 
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thought not to recognise a primary (rather than a remedial) right to secede for 
sub-state national groups
3
.  
2. Independence of overseas colonies: the principle that former colonies should 
be free from their old colonial rulers, and should be able to form their own 
government was central to the prominence of references to self-determination 
in the formulation of the International Covenants, and predecessor documents, 
in the post-1945 period. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in 1960, 
prefigures the wording of the 1966 Covenants.  
3.  Respect for indigenous peoples: the principle that indigenous peoples should 
have some measure of jurisdiction in their own affairs, and should have influence 
over decisions of their settler state that may impinge on their way of life. The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which had 
existed in draft form for in excess of two decades, was finally adopted by the 
General Assembly in 2007. It endorses indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination using precisely the same phrase as the 1966 Covenants, although 
governments for which indigenous rights are politically controversial have 
denied the rights agreed in 2007 and 1966 amount to the same thing
4
. 
The content of the principle of collective self-determination has been taken to be 
markedly different in each of these contexts. Although certain theorists may take one 
context to be primary, I will not make any such assumption here. Historically, a 
multiplicity of factors have made it expedient for various actors to invoke a principle of 
self-determination. From the perspective of normative political theory, it is quite 
possible that different kinds of putative moral justification may underlie ascriptions of 
the right in each context; it is also possible that a unified principle lies behind the 
multiplicity of applications. Our subject will be the supposed moral principle, right or 
                                                 
3 Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration, 1970 (A/RES/25/2625) provides a 
“safeguard clause”, according to which any government which represents its ‘whole people’ – which is to 
say ‘without distinction as to race, creed or colour’ – is expressly excluded from the scope of the self-
determination principle; groups within them do not have the right to secede. A remedial right to secede 
when such groups are not granted equal rights may therefore be justified, although this remains 
controversial. In this interpretation I follow Crawford 2007 118.  
4 The United States’ official declaration of endorsement specifically states: ‘The United States is…pleased 
to support the Declaration’s call to promote the development of a new and distinct international concept 
of self-determination specific to indigenous peoples’ (emphasis added, see US State Department 
Announcement, p.8, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf, retrieved 15 Jan 2016). 
The governments of Canada and Australia have made similar claims. All stress the document’s non-
binding status. 
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value of self-determination, rather than the legal status of self-determination. 
Nevertheless, as it is a supposed value that has evolved as a principle of international 
morality in a historically-situated way, it is, I believe, important to begin with the legal 
context of self-determination in order to isolate the subject matter. For our purposes, 
since we will be addressing particular arguments attempting to justify the prospective 
right, the justification offered will determine which applications are supported. Thus we 
will not begin by rejecting any particular application, though nor will we assume a 
vindication of one application entails a vindication of any other.  
In what follows I will use the term “SD-group” as a placeholder term for whatever group 
or collective entity we take to be the bearer of a right to collective self-determination. 
Many of the authors to be discussed have determinate views on the site question. They 
will therefore use a term such as ‘the state’ when referring to it. It will usually be most 
expedient to adopt an author’s preferred term for the site, as whether the reference is 
appropriate will be a central object of inquiry. However, on occasions where I wish to 
refer in general to whatever it is that possesses a right to self-determination, “SD-group” 
will be used.  
Scope 
It is significant that the right in international law was seen as falling within the purview of 
both International Covenants, the first of which mainly describes the kind of civil 
liberties handed down from the constitutions of the Enlightenment, which typically place 
obligations of non-interference on governments, and the second of which describes 
provisions, such as health and labour standards, that grew out of the socialist tradition 
and can be thought of as positive freedoms. The right to self-determination was arguably 
conceived as having a negative and a positive component. The ‘Janus-faced’ nature of 
the concept of self-determination lingers on in present day international morality: it is 
considered both a statist principle, which promotes stability by in some sense 
naturalising the system of territorial sovereignty, and a revolutionary principle of popular 
liberation. Inspired by Isiah Berlin (2002), I believe we can clarify this distinction as 
follows: 
Negative self-determination: A putative immunity-right held by an SD-group, which 
places a duty on external actors not to interfere with the group’s affairs, and is usually 
thought to include immunity from unauthorised territorial incursion and unauthorised 
involvement in governance by non-members. 
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Positive self-determination: A putative power-right held by SD-groups, which provides 
that the SD-group ought to have the positive capacity to determine its own fate, which is 
usually assumed to require collective action through an institutional structure of some 
determinate kind
5
.  
Although it may not be immediately obvious, these senses do come apart.  Just because 
a group of people on a given territory is left to its own devices, it does not follow that it 
is free to direct its affairs in a positive sense. Perhaps the group comprises various solitary 
individuals and families, who rarely meet and have no common political institutions. It 
would arguably be correct to describe the group as self-determining in the negative sense, 
but not in the positive sense. Thus self-determination in the positive sense involves, at 
the very least, some kind of political organisation. Yet a right to positive self-
determination should not necessarily be conflated with a right to democratic 
governance.  
Content 
Thus far, I have taken a loose attitude to whether I speak of self-determination as a 
value, a principle, or a right. Although I will be primarily discussing theories which take 
the basic currency of morality to be rights, many theorists who take morality to be 
structured primarily by interest and wellbeing are equally important participants in the 
debate. According to a widely adopted theory of the function of rights, defended by 
Joseph Raz, 
S has a right if and only if: 
a) S is capable of being a rights-bearer 
b) S has some interest(s) that constitute a sufficient reason for holding others to be under                   
some duty. (Raz 1980, 1988) 
 
                                                 
5 In International legal theory, there exists a distinction between ‘internal self-determination’ and ‘external 
self-determination’, which closely maps onto the distinction drawn here (see Hannum 1996, Senese 1989, 
Casese 1995). However, as there is some inconsistency in the usage of these terms, I have chosen to 
stipulate my own distinction. Allen Buchanan also uses the expression ‘negative self-determination’ in 
much the same fashion as just described. However, he contrasts it with self-determination proper. Self-
determination proper on his account ‘pre-supposes group agency’ (Buchanan 2016 450). I adopt the 
more neutral ‘positive self-determination’, as to endorse Buchanan’s view would pre-judge the argument 
of this thesis. Iris Marion Young (2001) has made use of a similar allusion to Berlin in her essay, Two 
Concepts of Self-Determination, although her concept of ‘self-determination as non-domination’ does 
not clearly map onto the concept of ‘positive self-determination’ invoked here. Robert Jackson (1990 26) 
draws a complementary, although not equivalent distinction between positive and negative sovereignty. 
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On this theory, in order to demonstrate that a given subject has a right, one must simply 
begin by pointing to some particularly salient interest that subject has, which provides a 
pro tanto reason for others to be under a duty to create the conditions in which that 
interest is satisfied. If that reason wins out when balanced against the competing claims 
of others, then the subject has a right. Thus, to say that self-determination is an important 
value is to say that if the right background circumstances are in place, a subject could be 
said to have a right to self-determination. I therefore take it to be of secondary 
importance whether one chooses as one’s project justifying the value of self-
determination, showing that a claim to self-determination can be justified, or showing 
that it is a right.  
If a right to collective self-determination applies to anything, it applies to groups. 
Satisfying Raz’s first condition, in the standard cases involves either being a natural 
person, whose wellbeing has ‘ultimate value’, or being an artificial person, whose 
wellbeing is not of ultimate value but may be of intrinsic value, or of instrumental value. 
Something is intrinsically valuable, to continue using Raz’s terminology, when it is valued 
for itself - something with similar qualities will not do just as well. Something is 
instrumentally valuable when it is valuable in relation to the achievement of some other 
value - its consequence - and is thus interchangeable with anything that will have the 
same consequences. Journalists may have a right to protect the anonymity of their 
sources, yet this is not because the interest journalists have in protecting their sources is 
of intrinsic value, but because it is instrumental to the general public having access to 
information. Not everything that is intrinsically valuable has ultimate value. In Raz’s 
example, a man may have an intrinsically valuable relationship with a dog, as it is the 
relationship he has built up with precisely this dog that is valuable. Yet (unless we believe 
dogs are persons), the dog is of derivative rather than ultimate value, in that its value lies 
in its ‘contribution to the wellbeing of the man’ (Raz 1988 178). ‘Collective goods’ are 
defined by Raz as inherently public goods, such as the good of living in a tolerant society, 
as opposed to contingently public goods, such as clean air (clean air could in principle 
be portioned out to individuals like fuel). Raz calls the thesis that only persons are of 
ultimate value ‘humanism’. The thesis that only individual goods, and no collective 
goods, can be intrinsically valuable, he calls ‘moral individualism’ (Raz 1988 192-8).  
The right to self-determination, therefore, may be said to be held by SD-groups directly, 
or only derivatively. They may have it because the group itself has some interest which 
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provides sufficient reason for others to be held to be under a duty (which creates the 
conditions of self-determination)
6
. Conversely, it may be that individuals have an interest 
that provides sufficient reason to hold others to be under such a duty, but it so happens 
that the individual interest is served by serving the group interest. This observation 
allowed us to characterise two distinct approaches to the justification of a right to self-
determination: 
Group approaches: These seek to show that the right of a group to self-determination is 
justified because of the interests of the SD-group, which are intrinsically valuable. 
Individualist approaches: These seek to show that the right of a group to self-
determination is justified because of the interests of individuals, which ground a group 
right because the group’s interest in self-determination is instrumentally valuable, insofar 
as it promotes the interests of individuals. 
Notable advocates of group approaches include Michael Walzer (1983, 1980), and Raz 
and Avishai Margalit (1990) in their classic paper on national self-determination. Such 
views, however, are problematic from a certain perspective: they are ‘opposed in spirit 
to contractarian-individualistic approaches to politics’ (Raz & Margalit 1990 456).  
Provided we accept one further premise of Raz’s - premise 1 below - this conclusion 
follows from the definitions already stipulated: 
1.  ‘Only those whose well-being is intrinsically valuable can have rights’ (Raz 1988 
178-80) 
2. SD-groups have important, irreducibly collective interests  
3. These collective interests justify the SD-group’s right to self-determination 
4. Therefore the SD-group is capable of being a rights-bearer 
5. Therefore it is not the case that no collective good is intrinsically valuable 
In other words, one cannot simultaneously hold the thesis of moral individualism, and 
defend a group approach.  
In the case of a theorist such as Walzer, this is not problematic – from an internal 
perspective at least – as Walzer is expressly concerned to position himself as an 
                                                 
6 I adopt the language of a Razian theory of rights to clarify the concept of an irreducible group right, but 
I take it that this could be restated in terms acceptable to theorists who do not believe rights reduce to 
interests.  
29 
 
 
 
opponent of the dominant liberal framework. Walzer argues that ‘communities of 
character’ enjoy the value of ‘fit’ between the government and their community (Walzer 
1980 216), and this value is worthy of outsiders’ respect. Like Edmund Burke, he argues 
that state institutions that have grown up organically to follow the contours of a particular 
community are a rare and precious thing, which should not be toyed with lightly. This 
thesis generates many of the rights associated with the idea of self-determination. It 
grounds a duty for outsiders not to interfere in the state’s internal affairs, as this could 
disrupt the fit between a people and its institutions. Moreover, Walzer contends, it 
generates a right to exclude:  
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the 
deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be communities of 
character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special 
commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life.              
(Walzer 1988 62) 
This form of argument is powerful, though it does represent a radical departure from 
the prevailing moral outlook. Although Walzer does not express it in these Razian 
terms, the argument hangs on the idea that the particular relationship between a 
community and its political institutions is intrinsically valuable, in the same way that we 
sometimes judge a work of art to be valuable. Thus, it cannot be weighed in a 
‘contractarian-individualist’ decision procedure, as this value is bound up with the 
‘internal life’ of the community; outsiders simply do not have access to it. We cannot 
say, for example, that interests immigrants have in entering the territory are more 
important than the interest the indigenous population has in self-determination, as this 
is simply comparing apples with oranges; it is akin to saying that Michelangelo’s David 
is more important than the Dome of the Rock.  
Such a view comes head to head with the dominant liberal outlook on certain questions. 
Walzer maintained that even the individual human rights of the indigenous population 
could not be weighed against the value of community by outsiders. Humanitarian 
intervention, in his view, could only be justified in cases where there was an existential 
threat to the community as a whole, such as genocide or mass displacement, as only 
then could we clearly say that it was worth endangering the specific way of life that had 
grown up in that territory. Even if individual rights violations were widespread – the state 
was utterly tyrannical from a liberal perspective – it would be illegitimate for an external 
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actor to intervene to protect individual rights. Similarly, we would have no grounds, on 
Walzer’s account, to condemn rights violations committed in the course of enacting 
exclusionary policy. Racist membership policies such as the “White Australia Policy” 
were founded precisely on the supposed need to preserve the character of the 
community. Within a liberal state, we would judge discrimination according to race to 
be a violation of human rights. Yet Walzer’s view cannot condemn, and indeed does 
not condemn, exactly the same forms of treatment with respect to non-members. The 
denial of moral individualism therefore leads to the denial of moral universalism.  
For Walzer, a self-described communitarian, this was precisely the point. Yet for 
theorists such as Raz and Margalit, who characterise their position as ‘liberal 
nationalism’, an insistence on moral particularism might be regarded as a larger 
concession. The two authors argue that groups that qualify as ‘encompassing groups’ - 
defined, to give a cursory paraphrase, as groups which share a common culture and for 
whom group membership forms an essential part of their identity - ought to have the 
right to decide whether to become self-governing. Self-government is instrumentally 
valuable to the group because it is, as a matter of historical fact, likely to help the group 
secure the values of ‘prosperity and dignity’. Self-determination conceived as the right 
to conduct a referendum on secession, is ‘the method of implementing the case for self-
government’. Whether or not there is in fact a strong case for self-government, therefore, 
encompassing groups are the sort of things that are often benefited by self-government, 
and thus they have an instrumentally justified right to self-determination. Neither 
Walzer nor Raz and Margalit deny humanism, they affirm the rights of SD-groups 
because protecting their interests is likely to serve the interests of persons, although they 
are not reducible to the interests of individuals. ‘The group may flourish if its culture 
prospers’ but, Raz and Margalit claim, ‘this does not mean that the lot of its members 
or anyone else has improved’ (Raz & Margalit 450).  
Again, from a certain liberal perspective, this could be regarded as incipient 
totalitarianism. Given that there is no clear way to balance irreducible group interests 
with individual interests, we may be worried about what would happen when they come 
into conflict. The authors claim for example that it can be in America’s interest to land 
on the moon, because of the collective good of international respect it will bring, even 
if individual Americans do not necessarily benefit from this. If one replaces America in 
this example with, say, Ceausescu’s Romania, it becomes easy to see why liberals might 
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have reservations about the abandonment of moral individualism. When the good of 
the nation is an intrinsic good, there is no easy way in which we can balance it against 
the good of individuals, and thus one may think individuals are in danger of losing 
important protections. Raz and Margalit would doubtless urge moderation on this point. 
Although we cannot reduce the collective good to the individual good directly, we do 
know the mechanism by which they are connected: individuals identify with the group 
and therefore subjectively view its good as their good. Under a sufficiently exploitative 
or barbaric regime, this kind of identification with the nation-state would be impossible, 
and thus it would not qualify as an encompassing group. Yet, as we will see, theorists 
who do not have the resources to invoke subjective value in this way may be more 
threatened by the moral particularism requirement. 
Three “individualistic” approaches will be discussed in the following sections. The first 
– individual autonomy-based approaches – expressly ground the value of collective self-
determination in the value of individual autonomy. They are arguably unable to explain 
why this individual value should give rise to a group right. Two other theories attempt 
to get round this problem by positing a group value on which self-determination is 
grounded: the group’s freedom to associate, and group property. In doing so, they 
attempt to solve the problem faced by individual autonomy theorists by simply claiming 
that they are not invoking an individual value, but a group value. Yet if this value is 
irreducibly collective, the liberal individualist position is under serious threat, as it would 
be to grant rights to collective entities that would conflict with and override the rights of 
individuals. Thus liberal individualists have reason to doubt these collective entities 
really have such rights. But if they argue that the group right is derivative of individual 
rights, they come up against the same problem as the individual autonomy theorists.   
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3. Three Defences of Self-Determination 
3.1  Individual Autonomy 
From a certain perspective, it is appealing to see collective self-determination as 
individual autonomy, writ large: the idea that a group of individuals should be just as 
free to determine its own ends as a single individual ought to be. Autonomy is variously 
regarded as the metaphysical precondition of agency, the condition of having a 
multiplicity of valuable options available, and as an intrinsic status, demanding respect. 
Liberals invoke Kant’s name when declaring autonomy their primary value, however 
close their conception might be to his own. Kant believed that it was individuals’ capacity 
to set morals ends according to reason that constituted their absolute moral worth as the 
final end of nature. In the political domain, he saw the capacity of individuals to view 
themselves as self-legislators to be the criterion of legitimate government. As such, he 
did not regard the source of law to be the foundation of its authority, but only its content; 
autonomy demanded a republican government, but not any particular decision-making 
structure. 
Nevertheless, the status of individuals as autonomous has been argued to be the 
foundation of a right to democratic self-determination. Daniel Philpott has argued that 
the right to self-determination is a corollary of a right to democratic governance, and 
that ‘the source of both concepts is autonomy’ (Philpott 1995 356). The link between 
the two is made quickly: ‘Democracy we may think of as the activity…of exercising one’s 
autonomy in the political realm’. He takes the value of democracy to lie in ‘participation 
and representation…the political activities of an autonomous person’ (Philpott 1995 
357), and further that these are also the values promoted by self-determination. Robert 
Dahl argued in a similar fashion, that democracy promotes ‘the freedom to live under a 
law of one’s own choosing’ (Dahl 1989 89), on the grounds that if a person is a member 
of the majority, then she is completely autonomous in that decision, as autonomy can 
be defined as the condition of not being overruled. Given all other forms of government 
can be described as rule by a minority, democracy maximises the number of 
autonomous persons. 
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The connection Philpott draws between autonomy and democracy is not thick enough 
easily to determine the particular conception of democracy to which he is committed. 
Unsurprisingly, he seems to set upon the dominant form of existing democracy, with 
equal political rights, universal though non-mandatory suffrage and the ability to ‘hold 
representatives accountable’ (Philpott 1995). If one believes participation is the value of 
democracy, and thus mere participation, rather than having one’s will actually realised, 
is regarded as achieving the value of autonomy in the political domain, one would have 
to believe the value lies in autonomy’s exercise, rather than its results or its potential. If 
we therefore regard Philpott’s conception of autonomy as something like the ‘mental 
activity’ (Mill 2001, 55) of employing our faculty of choice, then, as J.S. Mill concluded, 
plural voting would ensure this value was given to all in some degree, while serving the 
greater good by giving more influence to superior intellects. Indeed, this value could be 
achieved by virtually any political system, democratic or not, which had sufficient scope 
for individual participation.  
Furthermore, Philpott’s case for a right to self-determination on the basis of autonomy 
would be extremely weak. If we focus, as does he, on the application of the principle to 
the right to secede, any territory that was provided with sufficient opportunity for 
democratic participation by the state to which it was subject, would seem on that account 
to have no grounds on which to claim its citizens were being denied their autonomy. 
Anna Stilz offers a powerful illustration of this point (Stilz 2015 10). Suppose that 
France, in annexing Algeria, had given Algerians exactly the same voting rights as 
metropolitan French citizens, such that the affairs of a single entity consisting of Algeria 
and France were governed by a demos composed of the combined citizen bodies of the 
two countries.  If the value of self-determination is the same as the value of democratic 
participation, Algeria would in such a case have no claim to independence on the basis 
self-determination
7
. Yet this is the very opposite of what Philpott is trying to demonstrate. 
Thus it seems Philpott’s account of the value of autonomy, which both democracy and 
self-determination through secession supposedly promote, is best understood not as 
mere participation, but as something more demanding: having one’s will realised. 
                                                 
7 Raz and Margalit (1990) make effectively the same point: they observe that a right to self-determination 
grounded in the intrinsic value of political expression cannot justify a right to secede, as this value could 
be realised within a ‘multinational, multicultural polity’, or indeed, presumably, in international affairs. 
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And indeed, his other remarks do point in this direction. I take it that Philpott is 
committed to a Rousseauian conception of democracy according to which the efficacy 
of popular will is a primary concern. Philpott argues for example that secession makes 
it more likely that the group’s ‘political will’ will not be ‘polluted or hindered’ (Philpott 
1995 360) though combination with the will of voters in the greater state. He states 
further that groups with a ‘particular identity’ would ‘better participate and are better 
represented’ through self-determination. It appears this point is intended as a principled 
philosophical claim rather than a sociological one. In other words, the claim is not 
simply that in actual societies, minority groups have typically been subject to structures 
that have excluded them from public life. Rather, it is that giving such groups territorial 
independence will, as an abstract result of majority rule, be more likely to result in 
desirable political outcomes for them. 
But there are at least two ways in which individual preference can stand in a favourable 
relation with political outcomes at the group level. Niko Kolodny (2014) calls these 
‘correspondence’ and ‘influence’. An individual enjoys correspondence when her 
individual preference simply matches the policy decision made at group level. An 
individual has influence, meanwhile, if her preference has some positive effect on the 
policy outcome. To continue using Kolodny’s terminology, one has ‘relative influence’ 
when one’s individual input into the decision procedure (voting) has a definite effect on 
the outcome, without necessarily bringing it closer to one’s preferred outcome. One 
enjoys ‘absolute influence’ when policy outcomes are sensitive to individual preference 
across a wide range of decisions. Philpott insists that autonomy means ‘steering one’s 
fate’ (Philpott 1995 359). This could in principle point to the value of mere relative 
influence. Yet he also claims that an imagined society, which he calls Utopia, will be 
more likely to share a ‘Utopian fate’ if they enjoy self-determination. This suggests that 
they will achieve the value not simply of influence, but of satisfied preferences. Philpott’s 
claim then amounts to this: through both democracy and secession, we promote our 
individual interest in absolute influence. This can also be termed control. 
In response to Philpott, Allen Buchanan has observed that no extant democratic system 
is capable of delivering the degree of control that would seem to be required if one is to 
justify a right of self-determination on the basis of individual autonomy: ‘it is simply false 
to say that an individual who participates in a democratic decision-making process is 
self-governing; he or she is governed by the majority’ (Buchanan 1998 17). Given that 
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one is liable to be over-ruled by the majority on any given question, one cannot be said 
to be in control of one’s fate. Dahl’s argument is that we are more autonomous under 
majority rule than under minority rule, because majority rule ensures the largest possible 
number of people are not overruled on any given decision, thus maximising autonomy. 
Creating a more homogenous community would advance autonomy in the same way. 
Yet for one thing, this argument implies unanimity would be the best decision rule of all 
(as Dahl acknowledges). Furthermore the view assumes that every individual has an 
equal ex ante chance of being in the majority. If we allow for the possibility of persistent 
minorities, the thesis no longer holds true. Say there are four interests groups, who have 
to choose between three options, and the choice is iterated several times. In such a case, 
it is no longer true that majority rule always minimises the number of people who are 
overruled. Take for example a case of four sailors on a long voyage, who have to choose 
what to have for dinner each evening. They vote on whether to have meat, fish or a 
vegetarian meal. Alexei always opts for meat, Boris always chooses the fish, and Casimir 
the vegetarian option. Dima is a floating voter, he alternates each night between the meat 
and the fish. Although the largest possible number of people get what they want each 
night, because of the fixed distribution of interests, majority rule gives Dima complete 
autonomy, and Casimir no autonomy whatsoever. Although majority rule would 
maximise the number of individuals who were autonomous each night, giving Casimir 
the right to choose once every three nights would maximise the number of individuals 
who were autonomous over a three-night period. Thus it is not in any simple sense true 
that majority rule allows the maximum possible number of individuals to be 
autonomous. 
Neither Philpott nor Dahl seek to apply their arguments to the idea of exclusion. Yet it 
is easy to imagine how they might be developed in this regard. If we accept that there is 
a right to secede grounded in the right to ‘steer one’s fate’, by engineering a demos that 
is more closely aligned with one’s own interests, then we would likely also accept a right 
to prevent certain individuals from entering the territory, if in doing so they would gain 
the right to join the demos and steer our fate in an unwelcome direction. It is a widely 
accepted premise that an immigrant who remains on a state territory for a period of time 
must automatically be given the right to join the demos, given that the democratic theory 
of popular sovereignty demands that individuals who are subject to state coercion ought 
to be entitled to be involved in making the laws by which they will be coerced. Yet in no 
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democracy, actual or ideal, does participation in voting by majority rule necessarily 
promote individual autonomy when autonomy is conceived as control – indeed, it is 
rarely compatible with individual autonomy so conceived. Thus is it not the case that 
any particular exclusionary policy enacted by the state can be thought of as an expression 
of individual autonomy, as individuals lack control over the policy. Collective self-
determination conceived as an expression of individual autonomy therefore cannot be 
used to justify the state’s right to exclude, as we have no grounds to say that in upholding 
the state’s right to exclude we uphold individual autonomy. Democratic self-
determination as individual autonomy simply does not exist, thus immigration cannot 
threaten it. 
Although individual autonomy-based accounts of the right to self-determination have 
been quite effectively dismissed, they serve as a model, I believe, for a recurrent form 
of misguided reasoning in the immigration debate. Liberal individualists defend the right 
to collective self-determination on the basis of some typically individual right. Many such 
theorists believe rights function in a similar way to the value of autonomy. As we have 
seen, to be autonomous in a domain is to have ‘control’ over that domain. If we follow 
Christopher Heath Wellman (after Carl Wellman), ‘A’s right against B necessarily gives 
A freedom and control over A’s relation to B’ (Wellman 1999 19). In the next two 
sections, we will examine defences of the right to collective self-determination based on 
freedom of association, and upon property. These views claim to get round the problem 
faced by individual autonomy-based arguments, by claiming that it is irreducibly a group 
that possess the right in which the state’s right to exclude is grounded. Yet liberal 
individualism, I will argue, leaves them committed to the claim that the group right is 
derived from an individual right, and thus leaves them facing the same problem faced 
by the likes of Philpott. 
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3.2  Freedom of Association 
Christopher Heath Wellman’s argument for exclusion is based on three premises: 
(1) legitimate states are entitled to self-determination 
(2) freedom of association is an integral component of self-determination, and  
(3) freedom of association entitles one to refuse to associate with others as one sees fit  
(Wellman 2016 81, Wellman & Cole 2011 21) 
 
Thus we must first enquire what, on Wellman’s account, makes it the case that states 
have a right to self-determination? Unfortunately, Wellman states ‘there is no obvious 
way to theoretically ground my first premise’ (Wellman & Cole 2011 21). He views 
collective self-determination as analogous to the idea of autonomy in the case of 
individuals. Why? If we respect the autonomy of individuals, it is a small step towards 
accepting the autonomy of voluntary associations, because such associations are 
themselves part of the autonomous activity of individuals. Yet we cannot say the same 
for states, as Wellman acknowledges. Membership of the state is not something we 
chose, and we are often unable to leave without great cost, thus it cannot be considered 
part of our sphere of individual autonomous action. Yet while he recognises this ‘slide 
from an individual’s right to a state’s right to freedom of association’ (Altman & 
Wellman 2009 161) is problematic, he simply asks us to suspend our reservations, and 
to observe several features of commonplace international morality that he believes 
cannot be explained without attributing an ‘irreducible’ right of freedom of association 
to states. On the other hand, though he pretends to offer no full explanation, several of 
his remarks do suggest the state’s freedom to associate is explained by the individual’s 
freedom to associate. Thus in what follows I will explore the implications of each of 
these approaches in turn. I argue that it is possible to explain the norms governing 
relations between states which Wellman isolates without attributing them to a right to 
freedom of association – at least, not one that will do the job he needs it to. Yet if 
Wellman is forced to rely on individual freedom of association to explain the state’s 
right to exclude, this is even more problematic.  
Freedom of association and the state 
States are generally thought to have a right not be annexed by their neighbours by force. 
Wellman contends this is the very same right which justifies the exclusion of migrants: 
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‘if legitimate political regimes enjoy a sphere of self-determination which allows them to 
refuse relations with foreign countries and international organizations’ he writes,  ‘it 
seems only natural to conclude that they are similarly entitled to decline to associate with 
individual foreigners’ (Wellman 2016 84). Yet this claim is perplexing, as it is quite easy 
to see these two as utterly distinct kinds of right with unrelated moral grounds. The right 
to freedom of association is generally conceived as a political right, which protects 
citizens’ meetings (archetypically, the meetings of trade unions or political clubs) from 
interference, and is not typically applied outside the context of a particular society. 
There are innumerable reasons why we might think one country had no right to annexe 
another that have nothing to do with freedom of association. The prohibition against 
wars of aggression is arguably the fundamental principle of international law, going back 
to the time of Vitoria, and was deemed ‘the supreme international crime’8 in the 
Nuremburg Judgment. This principle would be adequate to explain the wrongness of 
forcible annexation, and would have no corollary regarding the right to exclude 
individuals
9
. Wellman and Andrew Altman suggest we could describe, by way of a 
thought experiment, a case in which one country annexed another ‘without disrupting 
the peace or violating the individual rights’ (Altman & Wellman 2009 161) of its citizens, 
so that our negative judgment on the case could only be explained by concerns about 
free association. But this is far-fetched. A forcible annexation effected without the threat 
of force would not be forcible but voluntary. Even if we imagine a country of pacifists, 
tragically unable to resist, the invasion would still involve the seizure of lands or property, 
such as government buildings, which would constitute wrongdoing capable of accounting 
for our judgment of condemnation. If it did not, then it would not be an annexation at 
all, but mere empty words, comparable to Idi Amin’s claim to be King of Scotland.  
Take another example: Wellman observes that states have the right to refuse to join 
trade agreements such as NAFTA, and political unions such as the European Union 
(Altman & Wellman 2009 161). To force a state to join such an association would be to 
violate their freedom of association. Yet again, there is no reason why we should draw 
                                                 
8 “Two hundred and seventeenth day, Monday 30 September 1946”, Nuremberg Trials Proceedings 
Volume 22. The Avalon Project, Yale School of Law Lilian Goldman Law Library, available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/09-30-46.asp, retrieved 15 August 2016 
9 Raz and Margalit (1990) make a similar point. They observe that while self-determination is ‘a source 
of title’, the right not to be invaded or occupied is ‘a possessory right based largely upon public order 
considerations’. There is a general prohibition against the use of violence in dispute resolution, violations 
of which mandate redress before considerations of title - such as self-determination - come into effect, or 
so the authors claim. 
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any analogy between the rights of states and individuals here. If the United States had 
forced Canada to “join” NAFTA through threat of military force, this would scarcely 
amount to joining an association. It would more accurately be characterised as the USA 
strong-arming Canada into removing tariffs from US imports, and into accepting various 
other trade regulations. This can clearly be thought of as a violation of self-
determination, but not necessarily of freedom of association. Similarly, if powerful 
member states forced Norway to join the EU, this would be to forcibly reorganise its 
legal system and demand the payment of “tribute”, in other words, an act of imperialism. 
Simply as a descriptive matter, international legal norms are such that the right to self-
determination is precisely a protection against imperialism. But the wrong of 
imperialism, whatever we take it to be, is plausibly very different from any wrong that 
might be involved in non-consensual immigration, owing to the specific forms of harm 
domination by another state power can engender, that unwanted incursion by an 
individual cannot. 
Thus there seems no reason to regard states as being bearers of a right to free association 
in of themselves. Yet it may be argued that this dismissal of an international right of free 
association is too quick. It is not enough to say that our negative judgement in cases of 
forcible annexation can be explained as a condemnation of the violence involved, as this 
leaves us unable to distinguish justified and unjustified cases of military intervention. If 
we believe, for example, that it is legitimate to invade a state in order to rid it of an 
unpopular dictator, when such intervention has the “consent of the people” (assuming 
we have some means of obtaining this consent), we need an explanation for why we do 
not condemn violence in this case, but do condemn cases of illegitimate annexation. A 
plausible response, it might be suggested, is that cases of justified intervention respect 
the autonomy of the people (rather than the state), and in that sense, their freedom to 
associate.  
To make this kind of argument, however, would in my view be to defend a controversial 
line of argument by means of an equally controversial one. In contemporary 
international law, there is no norm which provides that military interventions that have 
the “consent of the people” in the target state are permissible. Rather, the consent of the 
international community (through the UN Security Council) is required, and the 
intervention needs to serve a policing function with limited aims: the prevention of war 
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crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity
10
. Although it has been argued that the 
“Responsibility to Protect” in international relations should be interpreted to mean that 
a failure on the part of a state to protect the basic human rights of its citizens should give 
an automatic mandate to other states to take up the role of protector (see Buchanan & 
Keohane 2011, Welsh & Banda 2010), it is arguably still the more common 
interpretation that intervention is justified only to avert specific breeches of international 
law, and the R2P principle in general is still contested. In any case, it is certainly arguable 
that there is no case in which we judge intervention to be justified, which cannot be 
explained without the idea of collective autonomy. We may simply judge in such cases 
that the norm of respect for sovereignty has been overridden by the need to prevent a 
moral emergency.  
In response, a defender of the right to freedom of association in international relations 
might adapt the thought experiment, and propose we imagine a case in which an 
intervention had the consent of the people although their government was preserving 
basic human rights. But imagining such a case is very difficult. Many commentators 
would simply deny that such an intervention could be justified. Granting that we do 
think it could be justified, our judgement could be explained by prior assumptions about 
the conditions of legitimacy, rather than anything directly to do with freedom of 
association. If the people is to have succeeded in expressing its consent, although that 
consent is not shared by state officials, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which this 
was possible without the people having established some kind of political organisation, 
which repudiated the authority of the old state and which the annexing state was entitled 
to regard as the people’s legitimate representative. Given that this organisation would ex 
hypothesi represent the citizen body, it may be that we regard this shadow government 
as the sovereign authority in the territory. The former state, therefore, as an entity which 
claimed the right to use coercive force but lacked the authority to do so, could be 
regarded as a violent criminal organisation. The violence committed by the invading 
country against the original state would thus not be an act of inter-state aggression, but 
an act of justified state coercion carried out by an appointed agent of the new state. If 
we think state violence against domestic criminals is justified, then the violence 
                                                 
10 Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit, A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140, 
Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/World%20Summit%20Outcome%20Document.pdf, 
retrieved 15 August 2016 
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perpetrated by the intervening state would be justified for the same reason. Such an 
explanation would not require us to invoke concepts like freedom of association or 
collective autonomy.  
Wellman also supports his argument by means of an analogy between the right of an 
individual to choose whom to marry, and the right of states to exclude immigrants. Yet 
if we believe this right is irreducibly held by states, it is difficult to say what features of 
these two rights should be considered analogous, and why. The right to choose whom 
to marry is a protection against a form of social-structural oppression. Marital traditions 
typically grant husbands power over their wives’ behaviour, thus if marriage contracts 
entered under duress are considered valid, this could be tantamount to a kind of slavery. 
It is hard to imagine a situation in which the state’s relationship with a potential 
immigrant would be like this. Although hypothetically a massive influx of migrants could 
cause socially destructive harm analogous to the harm inflicted upon the victim of forced 
marriage, an argument made on this basis could not justify a discretionary right to 
exclude, only a right to take exceptional measures in the face of levels of immigration 
which posed an existential threat to the state. Such considerations need not be described 
as violations of a right to free association, but would come under more general principles 
of harm prevention. 
Sarah Fine (Fine 2010 355) makes a similar counter-argument against an analogy 
Wellman draws between religious associations and states. Religious associations are 
important sources of value in peoples’ lives. If the inability to control membership led 
to the inability to deliver that value, this would provide good reason for the right to 
discretionary membership control. In order to show that states had the right to exclude 
migrants at their discretion, Wellman would have to provide an account of what values 
he takes states to deliver, and to show that it would be impossible to deliver those values 
without the right to discretionary border controls. This may prove difficult. For example, 
if we take security to be one of the key values delivered by states, this would provide an 
argument for the right to exclude dangerous individuals, but could not justify the 
exclusion of the law-abiding. 
A defender of the application of a right to freedom of association in the case of marriage 
might point out that we need some further explanation of why forced marriage should 
be considered particularly wrong. Surely, they might say, a forced marriage that left the 
victim better off in all relevant senses ought to still to be criticisable, and order to do that 
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we need to invoke the value of autonomy, involving some idea that one should be free 
to choose with whom one enters legal and political unions. But we can just refuse to 
accept this kind of reasoning: either a forced marriage is harmful, or it is not. If it is not 
harmful, then there is no problem. If, due to some exceptional circumstances – 
clairvoyant powers, say - a father actually did know best about whom his daughter should 
marry, we should be prepared to accept that forced marriage would not be wrong, so 
long as we also affirm that such circumstances are so improbable that people’s interests 
are best served by a blanket ban on forced marriage. If we follow Raz, and contend that 
the value of autonomy is the value of being able to pursue willingly-embraced valuable 
options (Raz 1988 369), then trade-offs in autonomy are possible: although it would be 
a disvalue to remove an important choice, such as marriage, from an individual’s option 
set, it could in theory be mitigated if doing so greatly enlarged that individuals set of 
valuable options. Similarly, if removing some of my options were necessary to secure 
the interests of many other people, this would provide a reason for doing so. The 
Augusta National Golf Club in the US, and more recently the Muirfield Golf Club in 
the UK, have been criticised for their sexist membership policies. Wellman claims that 
even if we censure these organisations for particular discriminatory membership polices, 
we still endorse their ‘presumptive right’ (Wellman 2009 160) to determine their own 
membership. But we may equally well judge that such controversies show precisely that 
there is no blanket right to exclude, only a balance of competing interests that tends to 
come down in favour of club members, as in most cases to do so is relatively harmless. 
When exclusion is likely to reproduce discriminatory structures and attitudes in wider 
society, the value of “autonomy” is easily outweighed11. 
In sum, suggesting that the relationship between a state and an immigrant is like the 
relationship between an individual and a potential forced marriage partner, or between 
a club or religious association and a would-be member, is not enough to justify a right 
to self-determination that includes a right to exclude. Even if we accept the analogy, we 
still need to consider why we have a right to autonomous associations and unforced 
marriages, in terms of determinate ways in which people are made worse off by a lack 
of autonomy in these areas. Wellman’s argument relies on a series of equivalence 
statements: the right not to be forced into marriage is a right of freedom of association, 
                                                 
11 As Fine puts the point, ‘states’ rights to exclude are far more significant in people’s lives than the 
rights of voluntary associations exclude’ (Fine 2010 263). 
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the state’s right to self-determination is a right of freedom of association, therefore the 
right against forced marriage is the same as the state’s right to freedom of association, 
and thus just as individuals ought not to be forced into unwanted unions with other 
individuals, neither should states and individuals. But though these rights have some 
similarities, the transitivity of any particular features of the right cannot be inferred.  
Freedom of association and individuals  
It looks like Wellman’s best chance of justifying the state’s right to exclude via the idea 
of freedom of association, is if the group’s freedom of association is being viewed as a 
kind of proxy for the freedom of association of the individuals that comprise the group. 
In the context the right to collective self-determination as applied to the question of 
secession, Wellman has offered an argument according to which he attempts to justify 
the rights of the state by directly linking them to the rights of individuals (Wellman 2013 
148-157, Wellman 2005 34-65). I believe this argument is problematic, and its problems 
bring into sharp focus the difficulties associated with linking individual rights to group 
rights. 
Wellman grounded the right to collective self-determination in the respect owed to 
persons. He argues that legitimate states are worthy of respect in virtue of their ‘ability 
and willingness to perform the requisite political functions’ (Wellman 2005 57). The 
argument is that because this ability is the result of the collective action of individuals, 
we can say this respect is ultimately owed to individuals. The idea is that the state, 
although a separate entity from the aggregate of its citizens, is in some sense the rightful 
‘dominion’ of its people, and thus that infringement upon its functioning is an 
infringement upon the autonomy of individuals. This approach is very similar to the one 
adopted by Ryan Pevnick (2011), who argues on similar premises that state institutions 
should be considered the ‘collective property’ of citizens. The archaic term “dominion” 
evokes Locke, who argued that dominion over land was not granted to kings by God, 
but rather was granted for the “industrious and rational” use of it. Property-based 
arguments will be examined at length in the next section, so I will confine myself here 
to making remarks specific to the idea of dominion as distinct from property. Wellman 
draws an analogy between our relationship with the state and a parent’s relationship with 
a child (the direction of the relation inverts the classic formula). If, he claims, a teacher 
took whole milk from the lunchboxes of children in his charge and replaced it with 
skimmed milk, on the grounds that it was healthier, this would be wrong because it 
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would be disrespectful to the children’s parents and the way they have decided to bring 
up their children. The dietary choices of a young child are the proper dominion of its 
parents and therefore outsiders do wrong to interfere. The argument is that states are 
the proper dominion of their citizens in just the same way (Wellman 2005 56).  
This argument is problematic, chiefly because it provides an unconvincing picture of the 
right to self-determination in its central context - decolonisation. Colonial governments 
were very often both willing and able to form the requisite political functions, so prima 
facie Wellman would have provided an argument against the right to self-determination 
rather than the converse. Thus in the case of colonised peoples, respect is said to be 
owed for something that it is ‘within the capabilities of the group to achieve’ namely a 
state that instantiates self-government. Although he does not express himself in these 
terms, it seems fair to take Wellman’s position to be that colonialism is a form of 
paternalism, and the value of collective self-determination is the value of the absence of 
paternalism. This can be clearly seen from the way he sets out the view, as an interjection 
between an imagined coloniser and an imagined colonial subject: ‘“you cannot govern 
yourselves properly, and so we must govern you”’ (Wellman 2005 57). If Wellman’s 
argument were simply that that government by an external force was an affront to 
individual autonomy, this would be an argument for anarchy, not an argument for the 
particular value of collective self-determination in cases of colonialism. He therefore 
condemns another feature of the relationship in addition to mere domination: 
disrespect for capacities.  
Wellman’s imagined interjection is presumably meant to show not just that it is 
problematic for people to be denied the opportunity for self-government, but that the 
mere suggestion the colonised would be unable to govern themselves itself is a wrong. 
This would cohere with a class of theories that take the wrong of paternalism to inhere 
in a particular judgement (Shriffin 2000, Quong 2010, Tsai 2014). According to such 
theories, the presence of a paternalistic relationship depends on the presence of a 
particular belief state in the paternaliser, in this case, the belief that the subject is 
incapable of self-government. Yet there seems no reason why any such belief state 
should be present at all - the coloniser may think the subject perfectly competent, but 
colonise none the less. Historically of course, many colonial enterprises did express 
“civilising” aims from the very start. In the case of the British colonisation of India or 
Hong Kong, however, this would be more difficult to argue, as the project evolved from 
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one of establishing trade relations within a highly developed civil society, into one of 
total economic and political domination. In any case, whatever the facts about the 
attitudes of colonial powers throughout history, it seems inappropriate to ground the 
value of self-determination in the value of being untroubled by something as trivial as 
other people’s disrespectful beliefs.  
If we try to transpose this argument to the application of self-determination in which we 
are primarily interested - immigration control - the case looks even weaker. No attitude 
of disrespect is involved in immigration; in fact, admiration for the functioning of the 
receiver state’s institutions is more likely, given that migrants have in many cases been 
convinced to leave their homelands by the prospect of greater opportunity. Wellman’s 
argument seems to be that states have a right to autonomy because the state is owed 
respect due to the dominion relationship between a people and its state. But even if we 
grant that the state is owed respect, it does not follow that it is owed exactly the same 
form of respect as a person, including a right of freedom to associate. 
Thus it looks like this avenue for “connecting” the individual to the group right is closed 
to Wellman. Returning to the marriage analogy, it is obvious that the connection cannot 
be made in a simple fashion. The individual’s freedom to choose with whom she shares 
a state territory is clearly nothing like the freedom to choose whom she marries. For a 
start, she is born already sharing a state with millions of people, the vast majority of 
whom she will never meet, and while forced marriage is a potentially devastating 
experience, to be forced to live in the same country as someone else would just be to 
add one more person among these millions over whose presence she had no choice. 
Wellman thinks we can find a less direct comparison. There are more general benefits 
of a right of free association that can be compared to a right not to be compelled to 
share a territory with certain would-be immigrants. Just as for members of a golf club 
‘caring about our experience as a club member gives one reason for caring about the 
rules for admitting new members’ (Wellman 2016 83), so too does our interest in self-
determination give rise to an interest in exclusion.  
Yet adopting this approach is a large concession: it represents the abandonment of an 
irreducibly rights-based approach to the justification of the right to self-determination, 
in favour of an interest-based approach, and appealing to subjective values. To say that 
we care about the rules for admitting new members to the state is simply to say that 
membership control is a value for members. But it is open to a detractor to claim that 
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this value is simply not of sufficient importance to justify a right. Advocates of interest-
based justifications for exclusion are often acutely aware of this. David Miller, for 
example, whose arguments rest on the value of national culture, is at pains to provide 
reasons why this value is of special importance, over and above others: culture is ‘a 
source of identity’ (Miller 2016 68) which determines our values both in private and 
public affairs, and if immigration leads society to fracture into various identities which 
either compete to dominate the state’s public culture, or retreat into closed enclaves, 
this would be seriously detrimental to the interests of the ‘indigenous’ population both 
politically and privately. Even so, Miller is left with an account on which ‘self-
determination is an interest rather than a right’ which contends that ‘what justice requires 
is that the interest of a particular immigrant…[be] weighted against the interests of 
citizens in self-determination’ (Miller 2016 71). Wellman provides no such detail 
regarding why he takes our ‘experience as members’ of the state to be of such paramount 
importance as a value, and yet he feels entitled to rest a discretionary right to exclude 
on this foundation. We may rightly doubt that he has succeeded in justifying such a 
right. 
Freedom of association and control 
Wellman’s position seems to be that the state has a discretionary right to exclude 
because individuals have a right to freedom of association, which is itself grounded in 
the value of their ‘experience as citizens’ being conformable to their particular 
‘preferences’ and ‘tastes’ (Wellman 2016 87). This gives a more determinate character 
to the problem of how the individual right (or interest) is to be transposed into a group 
right: why should we think that the state’s having a right to free association would make 
the composition of the polity conformable to the tastes of individuals? We may think 
that all that was required was for the state to be sufficiently aligned with public opinion 
that it would tend to admit immigrants its citizens would find congenial. This would 
leave Wellman in a position rather close to Walzer’s; it would be a right of state-based 
communities to maintain a distinctive character (Walzer 1983 62), which is entrusted to 
state institutions based on the assumption they constitute a ‘union of people and 
government’ (Walzer 1980 212) which may be instantiated by any number of 
organisational structures depending on the particular history of the state in question. Yet 
this picture of the state acting on behalf of individuals cannot be characterised as 
exercising a positive freedom choose whom to allow into the state ‘club’. It seems 
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Wellman’s main concern cannot be mere ‘correspondence’ in Kolodny’s terms, but our 
interest in positive influence. We care about admitting the right sort of people, because 
we care about ‘what course [our] political community will take’, thus ‘an essential part 
of group self-determination is exercising control over what the “self” is’ (Wellman 2016 
85, emphasis added). In other words, we don’t just care that those who come into the 
country happen to correspond to our preferences, we care that we are in control of who 
comes into the country, as this is part of charting our ‘course’.  
Notice it must be individual ‘preferences’ and ‘tastes’ that ultimately matter for 
Wellman. Yet he asserts it is the group that is entitled to exercise control over its 
membership. The claim that I have an interest in what course my political community 
takes, and thus that I have an interest in being in control of that course, is very 
straightforward. But the claim I have an interest in the group’s being in control of that 
course is utterly dependent on how the group’s decision-making structures function, and 
my precise relationship to them. We might think the latter claim is analogous to the 
following one: “as a shareholder in a company, it is in my interest that the company 
should be able to hire whomsoever it likes”. Most likely, this claim strikes us as broadly 
true. Yet consider the background assumptions that render it true. First, we assume that 
companies are structured and run primarily for the benefit of their shareholders. 
Second, we assume that the managers in charge of recruitment are competent enough 
to achieve that purpose. Do these assumptions hold, mutatis mutandis, for 
governments? 
One important disanalogy between the two cases is that company managers know that 
shareholders want the same thing, namely profit. In the case of states, however, even if 
we grant the first assumption - that countries are run for the benefit of their citizens - 
those citizens might have such diverse preferences when it comes to policy areas such 
as immigration that it is unlikely an official could be fully competent to ensure everybody 
benefits. Thus, whether or not it was in one’s interest for the “group” to have control, 
where the “group” is understood as the state, would depend on the probability that the 
group’s decision would correspond to one’s own. Yet again, if this it to be more than a 
matter of sheer good fortune, and indeed a matter of a positive freedom to associate, 
this probability must be a result of the responsiveness of the group to individual 
preference. In other words, policy must track preference across a broad range of 
political decisions. Like Philpott, Wellman has claimed a link between the value of self-
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determination and the value of democracy. Yet where for Philpott the value of 
democracy and of self-determination are both explained by the value of individual 
autonomy, for Wellman and Altman, the ‘irreducibly collective moral right to self-
determination’ (Altman & Wellman 2009 17) explains the value of democracy. 
Although, as seen in the previous section, Buchanan is right to point out that democracy 
cannot serve individual autonomy, the Wellman and Altman argue that democracy 
serves collective autonomy. The question to be answered, then is this: is it possible for 
democracy to give a group control over policy to such an extent that it tracks individual 
preferences across a broad range of policy areas, thus justifying a particular policy as an 
expression of collective autonomy? This question will be taken up in the fourth chapter. 
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3.3  Associative Ownership 
Ryan Pevnick argues that a state’s right to collective self-determination is essentially a 
form of collective ownership. The state is, in Rawls’s phrase, a ‘scheme of social 
cooperation’, and such a scheme is, in Pevnick’s view, a kind of collective labour, which 
entitles us to group ownership of the social product. He argues that we own state 
institutions because it is only through our labour, channelled through the activities of 
‘paying taxes and contributing to collective political decisions’ (Pevnick 2011 35), that 
those institutions come into being. Pevnick contends that we come to own the state 
through a ‘Lockean’ mechanism. Although he recognises that Locke’s assertion that we 
are self-owners is problematic, Pevnick believes we can defend an account of property 
acquisition along broadly Lockean lines that does not depend on this notion. If we create 
value through our own activity, we make no one else worse off by claiming property in 
this value, as were it not for our labour the added value would not exist anyway. Pevnick’s 
position is an endorsement of the following argument from Lawrence Becker:  
When the labor is (1) beyond what is required, morally, that one do for others; (2) produces something 
which would not have existed except for it; and (3) its product is something which others lose nothing by 
being excluded from; then (4) it is not wrong for producers to exclude others from the possession, use, 
etc. of the fruits of their labors. It is not so much that the producers deserve the produce of their labors. 
It is rather that no one else does, and it is not wrong for the laborer to have them. 
(Becker 1977, 41 cited in Pevnick 2011) 
Becker and Locke’s arguments, however, describe a mechanism for the acquisition of 
individual property. Pevnick believes it can be used to ground a form of group property 
which he calls ‘associative ownership’ (precisely what kind remains to be seen). If we 
citizens of the state are also the owners of its institutions, then this can be seen to ground 
self-determination in both its negative and positive aspects. Property is best understood 
as a bundle of rights: it is made up of other rights, which vary from case to case and may 
include the right to use, the right to prevent others from using, the right to destroy, the 
right to alienate or transfer and the right to use as capital, among others. Yet of these, 
the right to deny others access to item of property can arguably be thought of as the core 
right (Honoré 1961 113), as it is included in the bundle of right in virtually every instance 
of a relationship termed “property”. It is thus easy to see how it could be used to build 
a case for negative self-determination: the interference with domestic institutions by a 
foreign power or foreign agent could, on this view, be regarded as a breach of our 
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property rights similar to trespass. Property is also a kind of authority. It allows an owner 
to do things with that to which she stands in the property relation. Thus, the idea of 
collective ownership may imply a collective decision-making structure about how the 
article of property is to be managed: it thus can be seen to provide a justification for a 
right to positive self-determination.    
In order to grasp the shape of the property rights bundle Pevnick claims we have, it is 
helpful to consider the different ways in which it is possible to own things together. The 
first (1) is typified by Locke’s claim that the earth was given to us in common by God. 
In this sense, we own the earth together, insofar as any of us can privatise any part of it 
as long as we meet certain conditions: that we are not wasteful and that we leave enough 
and as good for others. For Locke’s purposes, it was important to use this language of 
common ownership to counter Filmer’s defence of feudalism, whereby only kings had 
full title to land, inherited from Adam, and their subjects merely various kinds of 
usufruct rights. Common ownership was Locke’s competing interpretation of the 
Biblical account of the earth having been given to Adam: that it was given not to him as 
an individual, and then to royal successors, but to the entire human race. If we follow 
Robert Nozick, we might think that on a secularised version of this view, it was not 
necessary to describe the original common ownership of everything as a form of 
ownership at all; it would be equally adequate to describe it as an absence of ownership, 
coupled with a mechanism of acquisition that demands respect for the interests of 
others.  
Another way (2) in which we can own things together is equal private ownership. It might 
be said that a group of individuals owns a piece of land, simply because each individual 
owns 1/n of the land, where n is the number of people in the group. Sometimes, 
however, we own things together that do not divide up in this way. If a group of 
individuals own a house, they may say that they own a 1/nth share of the house. Usually, 
however, this does not mean that there is a 1/nth section of the physical property over 
which they have a full bundle of rights, but rather (3) that they each have a more limited 
bundle of rights over the entire house, constrained by the parallel rights of the others. 
This might be called joint ownership
12
. 
                                                 
12 In this taxonomy 1-3 I follow Risse 2012, Chp. 6 
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Finally, (4) we can own things together through corporate ownership. In such cases, the 
group comprises a corporate entity, which has independent status, and this corporate 
entity owns the good in question, while no individual has a direct claim of ownership. 
Depending on the constitution of the corporate entity, this may in the end look similar 
to (3) – if the company is a general partnership, for example. Or it may look quite 
different, for example if the owners are shareholders in a limited liability company. In 
this latter case, the shareholders may have none of the core rights associated with 
ownership in the item of corporate property, as these are vested in a chief executive or 
managing director, although they might have other, more peripheral rights, such as an 
entitlement to a share of capital gains. For example, although a shareholder might 
technically stand in indirect proprietary relations with respect to a particular car owned 
by the company, it is not the case that she necessarily has the right to use it, or to prevent 
others from using it. 
Which of these must the form of group ownership Pevnick invokes most closely 
resemble? (1) can be ruled out straight away. It cannot be that we as citizens hold state 
institutions in common for our use and consumption, just as peasants had the right to 
gather firewood on manorial land under the system of commoners’ rights. It is unlikely 
Pevnick would wish to claim that we have the right to privatise bits of state institutions 
as we see fit. (2) is equally unlikely: we do not each privately own discrete parts of state 
institutions, like owning a particular room in some Whitehall department – if we did, 
we should know about it. Thus, of the options under consideration (which admittedly, 
for all I have said, may not be exhaustive), it looks like (3) and (4) are the only viable 
candidates.  
Both joint ownership and corporate ownership can be described as ‘collective 
ownership’, yet both involve different rights, which are usually clearly set down by law. 
Yet Pevnick’s argument necessarily relies upon a Lockean, “state of nature” story about 
how we can come justifiably to own property, as if he is to establish a justified collective 
ownership claim in state institutions, he must do it through appeal to form of property 
that is explanatorily prior to those institutions. Citing a legal convention as the 
justification for an ownership claim cannot provide a reason to respect that claim to 
someone who is not a participant in that convention. Lockean arguments do, in theory 
at least, establish a claim that is not dependent on a particular system of law. However, 
they are not adequate to establish every right in the bundle we now associate with 
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ownership in modern legal systems, what Honoré called “full liberal ownership”. As 
Alan Carter observed, Lockeans are liable to commit an error of reasoning analogous 
to the one made by proponents of the design argument for the existence of God, 
scathingly attacked by Hume. Even if we can prove the existence of a designer, Hume 
noted, it does not follow that the designer is the god described by Christianity. Similarly, 
even if we can justify some core property right, it does not follow that we get “full liberal 
ownership” as part of the package (Carter 1989 132). In what follows, it will be argued 
that Pevnick does indeed make this mistake: the method of property acquisition 
described is not adequate, even in theory, to justify the state’s purported right to positive 
self-determination, because, as with autonomy-based defences of the right to self-
determination, it attributes to the state rights which may only justifiably be attributed to 
individuals.  
Joint ownership versus corporate ownership 
Pevnick presents several cases which are supposed to serve as analogies for the 
proprietary relationship between citizens and state institutions, and to respond to 
predicted challenges. One such case, Kidnapped Lecturers, is supposed to provide a 
response to the criticism that taxation cannot ground our collective ownership of 
institutions, since we pay taxes by force. In this analogy, some academics are captured 
and forced cooperatively to produce a series of lectures. ‘[O]ne cannot reasonably 
doubt’, Pevnick observes, that ‘that their labor gives them a right to the profits that result 
from the sale of the lectures’ (Pevnick 2011 37). We are not primarily interested in this 
challenge, however, but the question of whether the case elucidates the kind of collective 
property we are supposed to have. Unhelpfully, Pevnick chooses as his analogy a piece 
of intellectual property. As the lectures are infinitely reproducible, all that seems to 
matter in this case is how the profits should be distributed. Questions of how authority 
over the property is distributed are thus made to appear less significant, making it 
difficult to say whether the lectures own their work jointly, or as a corporate entity. This 
thus requires further investigation.  
Pevnick presumably wants to avoid certain conclusions that would appear to follow from 
Kidnapped Lecturers. It may easily be argued, for example, that the lecturer who spent 
long nights preparing well-researched prose should receive a larger share of the royalties 
than the lecturer who merely proof-read the draft. Yet, with the exception of some hard-
nosed libertarians, we do not think that that the benefits we receive from the state should 
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be in proportion to the amount of tax we pay. Pevnick apparently does not see the 
monetary value of tax contributions as a reflection of labour value, but, along with voting, 
as a mark of participation in a collective labour activity, something that is not quantified. 
But Pevnick cannot have it both ways. If paying taxes is a mere qualifying mark of 
membership, then he is saying no more than “those who qualify as members of the 
group ought to be able to determine its direction”. This would be a simple restatement 
of the principle of self-determination rather than a defence of it. It would remain open 
to the following challenge: why shouldn’t current non-members have the right to pay 
taxes, to vote, and thus to gain membership? The effectiveness of the Locke-Becker 
property argument lies in the idea that labour adds value. Yet if – as seems likely - 
Pevnick wishes to say something like, “group A has in fact contributed labour, while 
group B has not, and thus group A has the right to prevent group B from accessing the 
product of their labour, because they created this value” - then he must concede his 
argument rests on a comparison between the amount of labour performed by the two 
groups (some versus none). This is true even if, as Pevnick instructs us, we measure 
labour by its ‘creative and directive’ (Pevnick 2011 35) qualities rather than by how 
difficult it is. If one’s having laboured to produce something provides a reason why one 
should have it and not some other, then having laboured more than some other surely 
must provide a reason why one should have more of it than that other
13
. One would be 
responsible for creating a greater portion of its value. In other words, it is difficult to start 
from an individualistic account of property acquisition and finish up with a form of 
collective property other than joint property, which admits of shares of different sizes.  
                                                 
13 This point is raised by Marx in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Marx observed that under 
‘bourgeois right’ is necessary that labour be repaid in proportion to its duration and intensity. Thus, in 
the transitory stages of socialism, workers would be given certificates which had an exchange value 
proportionate to the number of hours worked. It was only at a later stage of development, when labour 
ceased to be a traded good and instead was recognised as ‘the foremost need in life’, that the maxim ‘from 
each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs’ (Marx 1996 214-5), could be realised. In 
other words, Marx’s claim is that so long as there is a convention of liberal property, it must be regarded 
as related to how long and how hard the individual works. Could Pevnick claim that he is positing a form 
of communal property that transcends the liberal paradigm of reward for input? He does make some 
remarks that suggest this: ‘although we cannot rightly understand the state’s jurisdiction as a kind of private 
property [it] is a form of collective property...[in which] the community as a whole determines how 
important resources are to be used’ (Pevnick 2011 44, quoting Waldron 2004). Yet if this is understood 
as such communal property, he would not be able to ground exclusionary self-determination claims, as 
these are derived from the convention of ‘bourgeois property’. Within some ideal communist paradigm, 
there is no reason why mere willingness to work should not count as sufficient for membership, given 
desert is no longer proportional to input.  
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Pevnick presumably believes that by stating we labour as a group, we gain rights over the 
product as a group, and thus the problem of just deserts does not arise. Yet it remains 
obscure what it is to labour as a group, and why property gained in this way should 
override individual claims to a greater share in state institutions. Imagine a clear case of 
cooperative labour: a collective farm. As members of a workers’ cooperative, the 
labourers are entitled to an equal share in the organisation’s profits, and they are entitled 
to it because they contribute their labour. Yet the mere fact that someone contributed 
labour would not entitle her to an equal share automatically. If for example, a stranger 
secretly laboured on the cooperative farm at night, this would not give her an instant 
claim to a share. This is because the cooperative is a kind of corporate entity with prior 
criteria for membership and implicit or explicit rules for the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities. On Pevnick’s account, that which provides a normative justification for 
property acquisition – labour through taxation and democratic participation - is also the 
criterion for membership: ownership and membership are the same thing. Thus it looks 
like we cannot be corporate owners, because in theory, at the point of property 
acquisition, we were not a corporate entity, but a set of individuals. Unless Pevnick is 
willing to lay down some prior criterion for membership, it seems that if we take the 
Locke-Becker reasoning to its proper conclusion, we ought to own a stake in state 
institutions proportionate to the amount of value we each added to them.  
Collective property and collective action 
Pevnick therefore fails to give an adequate account of how we come to own state 
institutions collectively when we labour as individuals. Yet a plausible answer is perhaps 
available: we may theorise that group property is acquired when it is created through 
labour in the framework of coordinated, collective action. For example, if we build a 
house together, according to a division of labour that capitalised on our particular skills, 
giving due attention to the goals and ideas of the other builders as well as our own, 
plausibly, we might say that it is irreducibly the group that has built the house. On 
Michael Bratman’s account, collective action occurs (paraphrasing heavily) when some 
individuals intend that “we” do some action, and ‘mesh sub-plans’ to make sure their 
individual roles in the action coordinate with one another (see for example Bratman 
2014). As described by Pevnick, voting and paying taxes look like remarkably atomised 
forms of individual action, which do not conform to Bratman’s conception of collective 
action, or any other conception. Anna Stilz, however, has argued that democracy and 
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paying taxes can be viewed as a form of collective action along similar lines as Bratman’s, 
if viewed more broadly as the activity of perpetuating a system of state coercion 
upholding a particular set of rights and duties, and continuing to shape that system of 
rights into the future (see Stilz 2009 173-208). Stilz does not invoke this view in the 
context of a property-based defence of a right to self-determination, but in defence of 
the view that we have special duties to our fellow citizens, which form the basis of 
political obligation. Here, however, we must limit ourselves to considering whether it 
can do the job of fleshing out Pevnick’s claim that we gain property in state institutions 
as a group. 
On Stilz’s Bratman-influenced account, what is essential for collective action is that it 
follow from shared intention. Thus, Stilz anticipates the objection that we seem to have 
no clear shared goal when we pay taxes and vote. Her response is that in democracy, 
our intention is that we formulate law together. We can recognise this as collective 
activity because of our meshing sub-plans. Following Rousseau, Stilz sees our intention 
as participants in a democracy not as attempting to assert our own desires and interests, 
but as adopting a stance which aims to promote the good of society as a whole. That 
stance requires me to consider your interests in formulating my opinion, and to intend 
that your interests be taken into account by society at large. In other words, it is precisely 
Rousseau’s General Will that takes on the role of shared intention, and thus we are 
entitled in her view to regard ourselves as makers or authors of the product of the 
democratic process - legislation and institutions. In more recent work, Stilz has 
developed this view into a defence of the value of collective self-determination in the 
context of decolonisation (Stilz 2015).  
It should be noted that there would be a large leap between the claim that we are entitled 
to regard ourselves as authors of state institutions, and the claim that we, as a group, are 
objectively the creators of the value these institutions contain, and thus we have a 
property right over them which includes the right to prevent non-members from 
accessing them. It seems clear that in long-established states such as the UK, the greater 
part of the value of institutions of state is not the result of the creative activity of its extant 
citizens. Much of the legislation that protects our rights, defines our duties, and 
establishes the framework in which our institutions operate is hundreds of years old, 
and it is not the case that anyone today, through democracy, exerted much creative 
influence over it. While it is probably true that taxpayers are collectively responsible for 
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sustaining the state’s institutions and its ability to defend their rights, this taxpaying 
activity alone is not sufficiently coordinated to be regarded as collective action. Most of 
us to not intend, in paying taxes, to play a part in the action of maintaining a system of 
coercively enforced rights. Many simply wish to avoid punishment, and perhaps judge 
that paying taxes is probably worthwhile considering the benefits we as individuals 
receive, as well as those received by others. Stilz writes that, in paying taxes and obeying 
the law, ‘we can say that residents are in fact contributing to the public coercion of one 
another even though they do not intend the entire joint project’ (Stilz 2009 193).  In 
democracy however, we are ‘party to a shared intention’ in a ‘more robust way’ (Stilz 
2009 194). Thus it seems Stilz concedes that without the activity involved in democratic 
participation, the case for regarding ourselves as authors of institutions would be weak.  
The challenge for Pevnick would therefore be to show that we are responsible, as a 
democratic public, for creating the value contained in our institutions. And given we 
played no part at all in creating the fundamental elements of these institutions, as this 
took place at an earlier historical period, this may be a difficult thing to do. As a 
generation of voters, we have been confronted with something that is already valuable - 
the state - and, through our democratic activity, have perhaps increased its value by some 
very small fraction of the total. Could Pevnick, through Becker’s reasoning, claim this 
was enough to gain property? It seems evident that we could not claim that others lost 
nothing through being excluded from the state, as they have lost the chance to access 
the value that we, the present-day electorate, cannot claim to have created.  
Pevnick’s answer is to argue that the state is a ‘society as a fair system of cooperation 
over time, from one generation to the next’ (Rawls 1991 15, quoted in Pevnick 2011 
39), a claim he illustrates through an analogy he calls Family Farm. A child is born to 
parents who own a farm, and ‘[a]t his birth, his family makes him a full and equal 
member of the business’ (Pevnick 2011 37). Pevnick observes that this child is clearly 
more entitled to determine how the farm should be run than someone from outside the 
family. Similarly, the analogy goes, it would be wrong for foreigners to protest that 
citizens of a state had no particular right to determine how it was run on the grounds 
that their citizenship was simply an accident of birth. Yet this this argument comes up 
against Carter’s problem: it assumes, illicitly, that our property right contains a right of 
bequest. There is no reason to suppose this right should follow from Locke-Becker 
arguments about creation through labour. The Family Farm analogy thus does not 
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present good reason for outsiders to respect citizens’ rights to pass their citizenship on 
to the next generation. It is clear from the fact different jurisdictions have different 
conventions for the granting of citizenship at birth – jus sanguinis versus jus soli – that 
such rights are constructed within a particular legal system; it is quite wrong to suppose 
that those outside of that system have reason to respect them. 
But perhaps Family Farm is a red herring. On Stilz’s reasoning, we arguably already 
have an explanation for the ‘generational’ character of collective property: the collective 
activity that gives rise to collective property is ongoing, it is a process which new 
generations join piecemeal as they are born and older generations die. The group is thus 
a temporally extended entity; it is “we” who made our institutions, because “we”, in 
Britain for example, are the British, which includes the Elizabethans and Stuarts as 
much as the Britons of the present day. But even formulating this position brings out its 
complications: “the British”, in the time of Elizabeth I, did not exist: there were simply 
the English, the Scots and the Welsh. The United Kingdom of Great Britain was 
created, in the most direct sense, with the act of union in 1706-7, but it really took shape 
when Britain began to expand its territory overseas; “Britain” came to represent the 
imperial metropole in a way that “England” could not. “We” cannot be identified with 
a process, a collective activity, because parts of that process have broken away and 
formed new polities, other parts have fused and formed a single polity. If the collective 
owner of state institutions is identified with a historically extended process, then there is 
no reason why this process should be identified with the current state. Much of the value 
of UK institutions was created through the collective activity of groups now regarded as 
the people of independent states, including the Republic of Ireland, India, the United 
States of America and many other groups. Thus it is difficult to see why a particular 
organisation, the state of the contemporary UK, should have the right to claim that it 
acts on behalf of a historically extended cooperative group of individuals
14
.  
Thus Pevnick faces a dilemma. If we own state institutions jointly, which would seem to 
be the default way of understanding how individuals could come to own something 
together from a Lockean individualistic perspective, we face a number of problems. If 
we each own a part share in state institutions proportional to the amount of value we 
have created, then it would seem our claims may compete with one another. A change 
                                                 
14 Fine also notes the difficulties arising from ‘ownership-membership claims of former imperial and 
colonial powers’ (Fine 2010 264) 
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in state policy would amount to a modification of state institutions, which, prima facie, 
would be a violation of some individual’s property right in her share of the state, unless 
that individual had authorised it. Thus Pevnick would need to provide a mechanism 
through which it was possible to claim that individuals had authorised the state to 
manage their property. If we own state institutions as a collective corporate entity, we 
face a similar problem: what entitles the state to claim it acts on behalf of this body of 
people, and has not effectively been stolen from the taxpaying and voting masses by a 
small cadre of politicians? 
But there is an even more fundamental problem with the corporate property approach. 
If the institutions of the UK state are owned by a historically extended corporate entity 
called “the British”, why should we care when this entity’s rights are violated by 
incursions from foreigners? When an individual creates some item, we care if others 
steal that item because a person expended creative energy for no reward, and that strikes 
us as unfair. When a voluntary association creates something of value cooperatively, we 
respect its right to it for the same reason: the particular individuals in the association 
have expended creative energy. But when a corporate entity creates something, it is not 
clear which individuals have been treated unjustly if its rights are violated. Because we 
cannot say that one generation has the right to bequeath the state to the next, we must 
draw a strong distinction between the corporate entity and those individuals that 
currently make it up. Certainly, the current set of people which constitute the corporate 
entity may be negatively affected by violations of the group right, but those individuals 
have no right not to be so affected. And if we are individualists, we simply do not care 
about corporations in the same way that we care about people. Corporations are usually 
entities established through legal convention, whose rights are backed by law. There may 
be sound utilitarian reasons for upholding a convention that grants corporations moral 
personality within a particular legal system. But when we have to assume a “state of 
nature” scenario, and begin from Lockean, individualist assumptions, as in the present 
case, it is difficult to see how a corporation could be sustained over several generations 
in a way that outsiders are compelled to respect simply because of supposed property 
rights. 
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4. Self-Determination and Democracy 
The ideas of democracy and of self-determination are traditionally thought to be closely 
related. The American Revolution, the historic locus of some of the earliest references 
to a principle of self-determination in international morality, combined both these 
imperatives almost without distinction: the idea that individuals should not be bound by 
any law to which they had not assented was of a piece with the desire to throw off the 
British yoke. In international legal theory, T.M Franck put forward the influential 
argument that an emerging norm granting a right to democratic governance had 
developed and ‘self-determination is the historic root from which the democratic 
entitlement grew’ (Franck 1992 52). 
In the foregoing sections we have seen three approaches to the justification of a right to 
self-determination which have come up against a similar problem. Autonomy-based 
approaches argued that the value of collective self-determination derived from the value 
of individual autonomy, and that democracy secured the connection between the two, 
because democracy was the expression of autonomy ‘in the political realm’. Yet they 
could not explain why majority rule should be considered an exercise of individual 
autonomy when the majority so often overrules the individual’s choices. Thus it could 
not be shown that the importance of individual autonomy gave us strong reason to 
respect the state’s autonomy, or regional autonomy. Wellman and Pevnick faced a 
similar problem. Instead of autonomy, they attempted to derive the right to self-
determination from other, typically individualistic values: freedom of association and 
property. Had they argued that it was precisely individual property, or individual 
freedom to associate from which the group right was derived, they would immediately 
have faced the same problem as individual autonomy theorists. As states are not 
voluntary associations, the individual right would be in conflict with the group right: for 
the property approach, this would mean that the state’s disposing of our individual 
property in certain ways would lack our consent and would therefore be a rights 
violation; for the freedom of association approach, it would be impossible to say in what 
way the state’s exclusionary policies could be an viewed as an exercise of individual 
freedom of association. Thus both authors attempted to circumvent such difficulties by 
arguing that these rights were irreducibly collective.  
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Yet this tactic also met grave difficulties. In the case of Wellman, it meant arguing that 
states enjoyed freedom of association on the basis of an intuitive argument about our 
judgements regarding international morality. But even if Wellman’s judgements about 
“freedom of association” in relations between states are correct, it is a step too far to 
derive an argument for “freedom of association” in the relations between states and 
individuals from such judgements, as the same intuitions may simply not apply. In the 
case of collective property, this could only be achieved by asserting that property was 
acquired through the collective action of a corporate entity. Yet there would be no 
reason to respect the rights of this corporation other than as a means of securing the 
rights of those individuals that make it up, and as it is historically extended entity, there 
is no reason to respect its property claims from generation to generation, as it exists 
outside of any framework of positive law. Thus much of the value contained in state 
institutions ought to be considered “up for grabs”, as it would have existed without the 
labour of extant individuals, and outsiders would be made worse off if the current 
individual owners excluded them from it. The authors simply cannot circumnavigate 
the individualist intuitions implicit in their approaches. 
What is manifest in their arguments is a desire to seek a compromise between the 
individualist approach and the attempted group approach. For Pevnick, to say that we 
have collective property is to say that ‘the community as a whole determines how 
important resources are to be used. These determinations are made on the basis of the 
social interest through mechanisms of collective decision-making’ (Pevnick 2011 44, 
quoting Waldron 2004). For Wellman, the state is akin to club in which ‘caring about 
our experience as a club member gives one reason for caring about the rules for 
admitting new members’ (Wellman 2016 83). ‘Social interest’ and ‘caring about our 
experience’ thus replace the more demanding idea of basic rights to free association and 
property (it appears the authors retreat to an interest theory of the functioning of rights). 
No one would doubt that we have various social interests in state institutions, nor would 
anyone deny that we care about what it is like to live in our state. They may, however, 
deny that these interests are capable of grounding a group right to exclude.  
Wellman and Altman claim that democracy is an exercise in collective autonomy. ‘In a 
legitimate democratic state’ the authors claims, ‘the group collectively rules itself through 
institutions of representative government’ (Altman & Wellman 2009 17). Pevnick 
similarly remarks that ‘only democratic institutions respect citizens as part-owners of 
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those institutions’ (Pevnick 2011 31). Yet they do not give a clear indication of what it is 
for a group collectively to rule itself, or what features of democracy are required properly 
to respect the state’s collective owners. Apparently they have in mind something similar 
to contemporary democracies. Yet contemporary democracies only partially instantiate 
the ideal of majority rule. In jurisdictions that are divided into districts which each elect 
a single representative on the basis of a plurality vote, and in which the legislature is 
controlled by the party with the most representatives, such a legislature can in many 
cases only claim to have received the votes of a minority of the population. In the United 
States, it is arguable that the electoral system is specifically designed not to maximise the 
responsiveness of the state to the wishes of the public. James Madison, a principal 
architect of American democracy, argued it was necessary to control the effects of 
democratic popular influence – such as ‘a rage for paper money, for an abolition of 
debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project’ - 
by ‘passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may 
best discern the true interest of their country’ (Hamilton, Madison & Jay 2003 44) – in 
other words, it was necessary to create an elected aristocracy in order to secure the 
interests of landowners, ‘to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority’15, as 
he phrased it in a more private context.  Given the explicitly anti-populist construction 
of many extant democratic institutions, we may question whether it is enough for the 
authors simply to talk of “democracy” as an instrument of collective control, without 
specifying some ideal conception of democracy they favour.   
There are potentially two ways in which the idea of democracy could forge the missing 
link between individual rights and group rights. The first I will refer to in general terms 
as ‘control’, the other as ‘authorisation’. As discussed briefly in an earlier section, one 
can be said to have control over a particular domain, in the sense I intend, when one’s 
personal preference tracks outcomes in that domain over a wide range of policy 
questions. An absolute monarch has absolute control over public policy, as his will 
directly determines the policy to be adopted. To say that one has control in a certain 
domain is also to say that one is autonomous within that domain. Authorisation, 
meanwhile, is the granting of authority to the state to manage one’s affairs as a proxy. 
When an individual grants a legal power of attorney to another, in respect of her 
                                                 
15 Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787, Taken by the Late Hon Robert 
Yates, The Avalon Project, Yale School of Law Lilian Goldman Law Library, available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/yates.asp, retrieved 20 August 2016.  
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financial affairs for example, she is granting that other the authority to manage her 
property in a way that preserves her individual autonomy. Authorisation is thus passing 
one’s control to another. The idea that governments rule by ‘the consent of the 
governed’ of course has its most famous articulation in the American Declaration of 
Independence. In this context, consent is another word for authorisation: the principle 
asserts that the authority to govern comes from the people, and they retain the power to 
withdraw it. Yet ‘consent’ can also characterise a relationship of control: if consent is 
required not just for one big activity – government – but a wide variety of policy 
questions, then policy can be said to be under the control of the agent. In what follows 
I will address each of these concepts in turn, in order to discover whether there is a 
workable conception of democracy that instantiates either to the extent that would be 
required to join the dots between individual and group rights, and vindicate the authors’ 
defence of the right to exclude. 
Control 
Niko Kolodny (2014) has argued that majoritarian systems of democracy are incapable 
of fulfilling an individual interest in control. He distinguishes 3 ways in which one’s 
interest in influence can be satisfied, each of which comes in one of two forms, absolute 
and relative: 
 Relative Absolute 
Contributory 
Influence 
One’s action (eg. voting), 
pushes the outcome in a 
certain direction, although it 
might not change the overall 
outcome, and has no more 
chance of affecting the 
outcome than anyone else’s.  
+ the outcome has far-reaching 
effects 
Decisive One’s action is such that had 
it been different, the 
outcome would have been 
different. 
See above 
Control One’s action would have 
been decisive over a wide 
range of relevant conditions 
(eg. when others vote 
differently). 
See above 
 
The three forms of influence thus constitute a hierarchy, where our interest in influence 
is satisfied to the greatest extent when we have control, and to the least extent when we 
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have mere contributory influence. One’s interest in absolute influence can be satisfied 
to a greater extent when one becomes more powerful. A dictator who enlarged his 
empire would advance his interest in absolute control. As Kolodny forcefully argues, 
however, it does not seem that voting can advance our interest in decisive influence or 
control.  
To illustrate, imagine a case where there are three voters and two options for them to 
choose from:  
α 1 2 β 1 2 γ 1 2 δ 1 2 
A x  A x  A x  A  x 
B x  B x  B  x B  x 
C x  C  x C  x C  x 
ε 1 2 ζ 1 2 η 1 2 θ 1 2 
A  x A  x A  x A x  
B  x B x  B x  B  x 
C x  C x  C  x C x  
 
Assume in this scheme that a majority vote is needed for either 2 or 1 to be adopted, 
everyone must vote for one option, and that the ex ante probability that a given 
individual will vote for a given option is at chance. In order for a voter to be decisive, it 
must be the case that had she voted differently, the outcome would have been different. 
In other words, a voter is decisive when, without her vote, the result would be tied. On 
this schema, this occurs in 4/8 cases for each voter: it is as likely as not that a given voter 
will be decisive. If more voters were introduced, that probability would sharply decrease, 
as more voters make a precise tie less probable. Having control is out of the question: 
if A chooses 1, there are as many alternate possibilities on which A choses 1 and 1 does 
not win, as there are possibilities in which A choses 1 and 1 does win, as we have 
stipulated there are an even number of voters equally likely to vote for one of two 
options. In a less artificial example, the numbers would differ, but it would clearly 
remain the case that the choices of many or most individuals would not track outcomes 
across possible scenarios in which the rest of the electorate voted differently. 
Wellman stipulates that democracy serves the value of collective control, rather than 
individual control. Similarly, Pevnick refers to institutions for ‘collective decision-
making’. These concepts stands in need of clarification. Wellman apparently wants this 
notion to be understood in a very loose way; he does not believe democratic institutions 
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to be required for a group to be self-determining
16
 (Altman & Wellman 2009 25-31). 
Yet the very fact they argue that collective control can serve the values of freedom of 
association and collective property goes some way towards determining requirements 
for collective control. In the previous chapter it was concluded that since the state’s right 
to freedom of association was said to be justified through the idea that we ‘care about 
our experience’  as group members, the state’s right to exclude must be dependent on 
its capacity to achieve a favourable outcome in terms of this experience. Pevnick’s 
suggestive remark that collective control of property means the state manages our 
property according to ‘social interest’ presumably has similar implications.  
These values of ‘experience’ and ‘interest’ are individual values, not a group values. 
Wellman does not argue that it is an intrinsic good that the group have a good 
experience, in the same way that Walzer claims (although not in these terms) that it is 
an intrinsic good that communities preserve a certain character. On an anti-individualist 
account, we might think, for example, that the state’s interests were explanatorily prior, 
that it was important to us that our state had control because our respect for it was such 
that we cared about its ability to advance its interests, even if they ran counter to our own 
immediate interests. Neither author, however, would want to go that far; it is clear that 
each thinks the value of having a good experience as members, or achieving various 
social interests, is valuable to each individual member. Thus the extent to which we 
value the state’s right to exclude is proportional to the extent to which the state is able 
to ensure each member achieves this positive value. As intimated in the foregoing 
chapter, it would seem mere ‘correspondence’ would not be enough for such a 
justification of the right to exclude to be characterised as an exercise of self-
determination, unless the state was responsive to the interests of individuals. If this 
responsiveness requires individual control, then as Kolodny demonstrates, this would 
be impossible under a majoritarian voting procedure. 
                                                 
16 The authors argue that people can exercise their self-determination in choosing non-democratic 
arrangements, by electing a monarch, for example, so long as there is a constitutional provision to reverse 
such arrangements by referendum, so that the choice would not involuntarily bind future citizens who did 
not participate in the original choice. Yet how would the people indicate its desire for a referendum? 
Presumably, the constitution would have to provide for referenda to be held on a regular basis – say, every 
5 years – in order to ensure that the “non-democratic” arrangement still had popular consent. In other 
words, the ruler would effectively be an elected president, given that he was obliged to renew his mandate 
to govern at regular intervals. Thus the claim appears to be self-defeating. 
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Yet it is possible that control is too demanding conception of the degree of 
responsiveness that would be required. Arguably, all that is required is that institutions 
are so set up that state policy tracks the “pro” or “anti” attitudes of individuals in a 
reliable way, without requiring that any particular policy outcome is preferred by any 
particular individual. If, however, this notion is given a more formal definition, 
difficulties again emerge. Kenneth Arrow (1951) proved that a set of axioms defining 
necessary conditions for a preference aggregation function to instantiate collective 
positive influence could not be satisfied simultaneously. While I will not innumerate 
Arrow’s axioms here, if we accept the premise that a preference aggregation function 
cannot fail to instantiate one of these conditions and its output count as the group 
preference ordering (‘the social interest’) – and this does seem plausible - then no voting 
procedure can provide “collective control”.  
Perhaps however, responsiveness can be achieved in ways other than the formal 
properties of voting systems. Perhaps representation can serve as the means for the 
transmission of influence (despite Madison’s efforts to ensure it did not). Philip Pettit 
(2012) distinguishes two forms of representative democracy, indicative representation, 
and responsive representation. The first functions by selecting proxies, in such a way 
that they serve as a model for the whole society; the second functions by selecting 
‘deputies’ that are supposed to relay the preferences of the people they represent, or 
aim at acting in their interest (acting as ‘trustees’). Pettit contends that despite formal 
problems associated with direct democracy, including the kind highlighted by Arrow, at 
least one of these forms of representative democracy can provide citizens with ‘an 
equally accessible form of unconditioned and efficacious influence that imposes an 
equally acceptable direction on the state’ (Pettit 2012 187). Pettit notes that it looks like 
there is only one way in which democracy can circumvent Arrow’s impossibility result 
and his own related ‘deliberative dilemma’: some form of deliberative democracy, in 
which the participants do not merely provide inputs in the form of preference orderings, 
but are able to reflect on their preferences in light of the stated preferences and 
intentions of others, and in the wake of feedback from votes that have been carried out 
and have led to irrational results (see also Pettit & List 2011). He further argues that in 
contemporary democratic states, a plenary assembly of all citizens would simply be too 
large for voters to engage in effective reflection and deliberation. Representation is 
therefore a necessary device to reduce the size of the deliberative assembly.  
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For the purposes of the present discussion, it looks like an indicative assembly cannot 
serve the function of fulfilling society’s interest in group freedom of association and 
collective property. For, as Pettit remarks, the relationship between the preferences of 
the group at large, and the result of the assembly’s deliberation is not a causal one, but 
an evidential one. The outcome is authoritative (if it is authoritative), because it provides 
evidence that it is likely the outcome would be preferred by the group as a whole. Yet 
because there is no causal link, it cannot be said that the outcome is a result of positive 
influence. The indicative assembly is just one possible means for technocrats to garner 
evidence about what the people want – a glorified focus group. A benevolent despot 
who was especially good at assessing the needs of his people would, we may stipulate, 
be able to achieve just as much ‘correspondence’ without consulting such an assembly. 
Yet no-one could claim citizens had positive influence in this case, as the decision is still 
ultimately the prerogative of the despot. The same could be said of the proxy 
representatives.  
The responsive assembly therefore offers our best chance for genuine positive influence. 
But here, problems of the kind Kolodny raised resurface. For in the election of deputies, 
those who vote for another candidate, and find themselves in the minority, have had no 
positive influence. Pettit wishes to claim that causal influence lies in the fact deputies are 
beholden to the electorate for their re-election, and must therefore attempt to respond 
to their concerns. But arguably, as far as someone in the minority concerned, the deputy 
is here again no different from a benevolent despot: the deputy’s will is the only thing 
that counts in the final analysis, and the electorate’s preferences have no direct power to 
influence it. Thus it is a contingent matter whether granting a representative democracy 
the right to exclude will lead individuals’ ‘experience as citizens’ to be conformable to 
their preferences, or whether they achieve their particular social interests. This provides 
a very weak argument for exclusion, which in essence can be summarised as claiming 
that the state has the right to exclude because state officials have good reason to believe 
their citizens will prefer a certain exclusionary policy. Without introducing some 
“realist” claim, that states only have duties to serve the interests of their citizens, the 
value of preference satisfaction served by exclusion cannot be deemed sufficiently 
important to ground the state’s right to exclude. 
It should be noted I do not wish to claim Pettit’s argument fails. Pettit’s aim is to describe 
a form of democracy capable of rendering the acts of the state non-dominating with 
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respect to its citizens. This is a much less demanding aim than finding a conception of 
democracy capable of instantiating some positive popular will, of the kind implicit in the 
idea of positive self-determination. Pettit was indeed concerned expressly to deny that 
any search for this latter vision of democracy could bear fruit. Yet it looks like it is 
precisely this conception of democracy that would be required to render the justification 
of the right to exclude by means of the right to collective self-determination 
comprehensible.  
In recent work, Sarah Song (forthcoming) argues definitively that it is self-
determination’s status as a principle of democratic control that generates a right to 
exclude. She sets out the argument as follows:  
1. A people/demos has a right to self-determination. 
2. The right to self-determination includes the right to control admission and 
membership. 
3. The demos should be bounded by the territorial boundaries of the state. 
4. Citizens of a territorial state, in virtue of their role as members of the (territorially 
defined) demos, have the right to control admission and membership. 
For Song, the right to self-determination just is a right to a minimal form of democratic 
governance, and it is justified for the same reason that democracy has widely been said 
to be justified: because it is the best way of showing equal respect for individuals (see 
Kolodny 2014b, Christiano 2008). She then treats the question of the right to exclude 
as an extension of the “boundary problem” in democratic theory: she argues, for various 
instrumental reasons, that the actual boundary of the state is the best way of determining 
who should belong to the demos. Her reasons include the idea that states define the 
rights that create the background conditions of democracy, and unless we all belong to 
one state, we are likely to disagree about how our democracy should be run. She argues 
further that the state is the main site of solidarity, meaning one has a greater stake in the 
successful running of the institutions of one’s own state, and that it is expedient that 
political representatives are accountable to a particularly pre-determined group of 
individuals. The argument scores over Pevnick and Wellman’s accounts in an important 
respect – it provides an account of why the individuals who live within a state should 
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have the right to control a particular state boundary rather than just membership of their 
group.  
Yet it also shares with them, I believe, a significant oversight. It is states that enact 
exclusionary policies, while it is the demos that has the right to control who should 
become part of the democratic community. If a demos has an interest in controlling its 
membership, it must surely be because of the effect this will have on the wellbeing of its 
individual members. If, however, the value of democracy is simply that it represents our 
moral equality, as Song maintains, then institutions can be “democratic” without 
affording us “control” over policy – this is precisely Kolodny’s point. One problem, 
then, is it is unclear why “self-determination” as she understands it - the right to live 
under institutions that show due respect for our moral equality - should give rise to a 
right to control membership, as there is no a priori connection between who is allowed 
to be a member of the group, and whether institutions will be capable of representing 
them as equals. More importantly, however, as with Wellman and Pevnick, Song does 
not explain why whatever she understands by “democratic control” can be expected to 
generate outcomes which will advance our particular interests.  
Authorisation 
Perhaps however the relationship between the individual and the state, capable of 
conferring the rights of the individual upon the state, is one of authorisation. Various 
authors have in the past argued that democracy can serve this function. The 
Enlightenment theorists Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau all produced arguments to the 
effect that majority rule is the natural decision procedure in any political unit, 
membership of a political unit implies acceptance of majority rule, and thus acceptance 
of its outcomes. Hobbes argued that ‘if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in 
the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than 
enough to destroy the Affirmatives’ (Hobbes 1996 114) and thus the negative will win 
out, like a resultant force. Locke argued that when a group of people have ‘made a 
community’, since ‘it being necessary for that which is one body to move one way’, it 
ought necessarily to move ‘whither the greater force carries it’. (Locke 1988 331). 
Rousseau claimed that in voting, citizens were being asked to give their opinion on the 
content of the general will, thus ‘the tally of votes yields the declaration of the general 
will’ (Rousseau 1997 124). Yet all these theorists argue that the very joining of a political 
community, or being part of a political community, constitutes the act which authorises 
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the majority to act on one’s behalf. Thus for all three, majority rule must be founded on 
initial unanimity. For Hobbes, individuals become ‘authors’ of the state, meaning 
everything the state does becomes an act they must avow as their own. Rousseau 
similarly claims that the general will is the will of each individual, and that, paradoxically, 
if the state followed my private will as opposed to the general will, I would not be free.  
If such claims can be justified, this would clearly do the job of connecting individual 
rights to the group right. Hobbes’ assertion that the state acts ‘by Commission, or 
Licence from him whose right it is’ (Hobbes 1996 122), is precisely the claim that the 
state’s rights are derived from a transference of individual rights. An act of exclusion on 
the part of the state could thus count as an exercise of my individual freedom of 
association, or as a justified defence of my property rights. These ideas have, however, 
somewhat fallen out of favour since being formulated by Enlightenment political 
philosophers. As already discussed, if the state is a voluntary association, then we can 
certainly give sense to the idea that its acts are acts of its individual members. A useful 
analogy is the convention of cabinet collective responsibility in the Westminster system 
of government: a cabinet member may not disavow any determination of the cabinet, 
because she has the right to resign from any cabinet with whose policy positions she 
cannot agree. Yet the idea that we tacitly consent to the authority of the state is widely 
considered problematic, precisely because we have nothing analogous to this right to 
resign: we can tear up our identity documents and live as a stateless person in another 
country, but the associated costs are so high that not doing so cannot be considered a 
voluntary position.  
It seems, however, that Pevnick in particular does consider voluntaristic relationships to 
be central to his argument. He claims that irregular immigration can be condemned 
because ‘illegal immigrants…took their place in the community without the consent of 
the citizenry’ (Pevnick 2011 164). Given that he acknowledges states are not voluntary 
associations, why should we think that particular pieces of immigration policy express 
popular consent? Some have argued that democratic participation itself can count as an 
act of authorisation. On this type of view, merely taking part in a democratic procedure 
can serve to express one’s consent for the outcome, even if one ends up on the losing 
side. This seems prima facie implausible, as it appears one can vote without intending 
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any such consent, and one cannot consent unintentionally
17
. Yet perhaps something like 
Stilz’s claim, discussed in the previous chapter, can furnish the relevant intention. We 
intend to legislate together, she claims, and thus it would be implicit that we intend the 
outcome of the collective action even if it goes against our preferences.  
But this argument requires us to have a particular complex attitude towards the state: it 
requires us to view elections as a cooperative activity aimed at producing legislation 
together. I would argue that this is psychologically unrealistic. Elections are typically 
characterised by bitter factional disputes, and are better understood through the rubric 
of conflict, rather than cooperation. Just as war can be regarded as the continuation of 
politics by other means, politics is war with its teeth removed. Note that given it is actual 
psychological attitudes that are key here, it is not enough to argue that on some ideal 
conception of democracy, for example some version of deliberative democracy, this 
combative aspect would disappear. As an ideal conception of deliberative democracy 
has never been instantiated, we can present no evidence for the claim.  
The ideal of deliberative democracy may be characterised (among other ways) as 
reaching a decision through ‘an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake with 
the aim of arriving at an agreed judgement … a process whereby initial preferences are 
transformed to take account of the views of others’ (Miller 2000 9). This characterisation 
really does make democracy sound like a cooperative activity. But if we consider how 
extant deliberative assemblies operate, the story is quite different: agreement is typically 
reached through horse-trading among the pet policies of various factions, rather than 
rational reflection on the content of the ‘general will’. The distribution of interests 
creates arbitrary bargaining advantages, and in practice each faction is likely to be 
focused on achieving its own preferred outcome, which it may seek to accomplish 
through deception, intimidation or institutional manipulation. As Miller writes, ‘for 
deliberative democracy to work well’, even in theory, ‘people must think it more 
important that the decision reached be a genuinely democratic one than that it be one 
they themselves favour’ (Miller 2000 22). It may be that people would adopt such 
attitudes if a democratic system that better instantiated the deliberative ideal were 
introduced, but it seems more likely that the psychological attitudes expressed in 
contemporary democratic processes would persist. 
                                                 
17 At least, plausibly, one cannot consent unintentionally. Both A.John Simmons (1986 81), and Joel 
Feinberg (1994 167), have termed the idea an ‘absurdity’.  
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We should note that this idea of authorisation as a transmission of rights is problematic 
even if an appropriate mechanism could be found. Rights are not things we own, they 
are relationships between individuals. Simply because I have a right to freedom of 
association, it does not follow that I have a right to pass the right to choose with whom 
I associate to another. Property rights typically can be transferred to another, but as we 
saw in the previous chapter, it is not necessarily the case that the minimal form of 
property that could perhaps be acquired in a “state of nature” can be transferred. It 
would have to be the case that the reasons that justify my having some right still apply if 
I transfer my right to another. If we suppose that my right to freedom of association is 
grounded not simply in the value the associations of which I am a member being 
favourable for me, but in the value of being able actively to direct my own life, then on 
“transferring” my right to the state, I would lose this value. There would thus be no 
reason to grant that I possess the power to transfer my right at all. That said, the same 
does not appear to be true for the property conception: if we jointly own some piece of 
property, it could be expedient for us to appoint a manager for that property, so long as 
we retain most of the benefits of ownership.  
It appears then that neither the ideal of control, nor of authorisation, can explain why 
democracy should be capable of conferring the rights of individuals upon states. It is 
important here to draw a distinction between democracy as a set of institutions, and 
democracy as a regulative ideal. Similarly, it is important to draw a distinction between 
the state’s right to exclude, on the basis of a right to self-determination which may involve 
some ideal conception of democracy, and the exclusionary policies of extant states. 
Although an ideal conception of deliberative democracy could go some way towards 
painting a picture on which the state’s right to exclude could be regarded as an exercise 
of individual rights, we must bear in mind what these theorists are trying to do with their 
justificatory arguments. They are trying to argue that actual states possess the right to 
exclude, admittedly with some limitations in comparison to their current powers. Thus 
although certain groups may possess the right to self-determination, and although the 
right to exclude might come as part of a package with a particular conception of 
democratic self-determination, it is a mistake immediately to leap towards attributing a 
right to exclude to contemporary states, as that right could only legitimately be realised 
through realising the proper conception of democratic self-determination.  
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5. Conclusion 
J.S Mill argued that the ‘sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, 
is that people do actually desire it’ (Mill 1998 81). If the UK’s vote to leave the European 
Union, and the tenor of the political debate in the USA at time of writing show us 
anything, it is that ‘control’ over borders and immigration policy is considered to be an 
extremely important value in contemporary public life. Thus we should be careful not 
entirely to disparage the value of collective control through liberal democratic 
institutions. That said, we should also be careful to assess whether the value people seek 
is accurately characterised in public discourse.  
It can be of value to me, as a subject of a dictatorship, for that dictator to have control. 
So long as I identify with the dictator to a sufficient extent, or hold him in sufficiently 
high regard, I will believe it is valuable that his decision is decisive over a wide variety of 
policy questions. Moreover, it may be that the dictator’s having control is intrinsically 
valuable to me: I may not value it simply because I trust the him to act in my best interest, 
but because I hold him in such high esteem that I believe he ought to have control even 
if he is likely to make mistakes. Thus it is quite possible for individuals to value state 
institutions advancing their interest in control, without that implying the individual is a 
member of a collective which exercises control through state institutions.  
Simply from the fact we tend to place a great deal of value in the institutions of our 
liberal democratic state being able to exercise control over who may enter the state’s 
territory, therefore, it does not follow that it is valuable as an exercise of our collective 
control, even if we believe this is the reason we value it. As nationalist and 
communitarian authors stress, members of particular states typically have a deep sense 
of affinity with the institutions of their state, and, on a sociological level, it is probable 
that it is this trust that explains why we value the state’s ability to exclude, rather than any 
objective link between our individual rights and those of the state. Yet the idea that it is 
intrinsically valuable to citizens that their states be able to exercise control over borders 
threatens to justify too much from a liberal individualist perspective: it would mean that 
individual rights not easily be weighed in the balance in the face of intrinsically collective 
values. Thus liberal individualist authors who assert the value of collective control in 
order to justify exclusion need to show that this value consists in something more than 
mere subjective affinity. 
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This is the position Pevnick and Wellman find themselves. Both offer defences of self-
determination on the basis of an intrinsically collective value, yet this position is in 
tension with their background moral approach. Both believe that morality is 
fundamentally rights-based, and both think that rights are explained by the respect owed 
to individual persons. Wellman is well aware that there is a gap to be closed between his 
attribution of a group right, and the individual rights on which it must ultimately be 
based. But, I have argued, he is unable to close that gap. Pevnick, meanwhile asserts that 
the same reasons that justify an individual’s acquisition of property rights should also 
apply to a collective acquisition of property. He is, however, unable to force 
individualistic intuitions about property acquisition to fit the group case. 
Throughout this thesis I have referred to the target of my critique as “liberal 
individualists”, and I do believe the failure of the arguments with which I have chiefly 
been concerned represents a general problem for authors with certain common 
commitments. I view my critique of Pevnick and Wellman as “case studies”, which can 
be seen as implying a critique of a certain “liberal individualist” approach. I concede, 
however, that I may only have provided evidence for a more general claim rather than 
having demonstrated anything definitively. “Liberal individualism” has served as a 
placeholder term for subject of my criticism, and it falls to me now to make this notion 
more precise. In the second chapter I referred to Raz’s definition of “moral 
individualism” as the view that there were no intrinsic collective goods. Theorist who 
attribute irreducible rights to groups cannot be moral individualists, by definition. Thus 
Pevnick and Wellman would not claim to be moral individualists in Raz’s sense. Yet I 
contend that in essence, they do have this commitment, and it is this which leads their 
accounts to imply a right to positive self-determination, conceived in a way that would 
require the group to have a particularly demanding form of “collective control” – an 
institutional structure that makes state policy positively sensitive to individual 
preferences.  
Wellman specifically repudiates “associativism” in political theory, the name he gives to 
the tendency of liberal nationalists and communitarians to derive rights and duties from 
‘mere’ social relations, such as common nationality. The particular objection is that 
social relations as bare facts cannot be morally salient, but must rather be analysed either 
in terms of voluntary commitments or ‘more fundamental moral principle[s]’ (Wellman 
2013 31) – which is to say individual claims, such the claim to have one’s autonomy 
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respected or individual basic rights. Pevnick also expresses antipathy for this tendency, 
opposing cultural nationalist arguments on the grounds that ‘it is not obvious that the 
mere existence of cultural similarity’ could justify a right to exclude, but rather ‘any 
persuasive explanation is going to hinge on the historical role members of the culture in 
question have had in constructing the institutions to which access is at stake’ (Pevnick 
2011 135). Again, he denies the mere existence of social relations can generate rights, 
and stresses the entitlements of individual members of the culture.  
What precisely is the problem with the idea that social relations can generate rights? 
Views that Wellman would call “associative” function through the observation that 
finding ourselves in particular social relations creates special interests. As members of a 
family, we are interested in the wellbeing of our relatives just as we are interested in our 
own wellbeing. If we are fans of a football team, it becomes important to us that the 
team does well. If we believe, with Raz, that such powerful interests are all that rights 
ultimately consist in, then it is completely unmysterious why associative relations should 
generate rights. What Wellman (and apparently Pevnick) deny when they reject 
‘associativism’, is just the interest theory of rights. Wellman explicitly rejects the interest 
theory; on his preferred ‘dominion theory’, rights essentially give their bearers control 
over others with respect to their relations with the right-bearer (Wellman 1999). It is 
reasonable to conclude Pevnick takes a similar view.    
Herein lies the source of the problem. For if we believe that rights are interests, then the 
question of which agency has the authority to uphold our rights is essentially irrelevant. 
If, for example, the interest individuals have in their community preserving its unique 
character is of sufficient importance that they have a claim-right that this character be 
preserved, then it is obvious that the state may act to preserve that right, because any 
agency that was suitably positioned to uphold the right would have not just a permission, 
but a duty, to do so. Yet if we believe that all rights are essentially individual powers over 
claims – forms of control – then the exercise of rights must be the exercise of individual 
agency. This feature of Wellman and Pevnick’s view is what gives rise to a discretionary 
right to exclude. On Wellman’s account, we have a claim not to associate with people, 
and a power to waive that claim. On Pevnick’s, we have a claim of exclusive access to 
our property, and a power to consent to others accessing it if we so choose. Deciding 
whom to allow into our rightful domain is thus entirely up to us. The problem, as we 
have seen, is that if the power to waive our claims is ultimately vested in individuals, we 
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need to provide a story about why the state is the agency which is allowed to exercise the 
right to exclude. This is why their accounts seemed to require democracy to act as a 
kind of conduit of individual agency. But, as I have argued, democracy is not capable of 
fulfilling that role. 
From this it follows that if one accepts ‘humanism’, one cannot consistently assert that 
collectives have irreducible rights while denying ‘associativism’. When, for example, 
Wellman claims that the state has a right to freedom of association, what he is saying is 
that the state has the power to waive its claim over a domain of free association. But the 
state is not a person, so this claim cannot rest on anything like the ultimate value of its 
autonomy. Thus the right must be derivable from the rights of individuals. The claim 
that a group right is irreducible, however, is precisely the claim that it cannot be analysed 
in terms of individual rights. If, on the other hand, we accept an interest theory of the 
functioning of rights, we can easily accept the idea of irreducible group rights. We may 
argue, to use Raz and Margalit’s example, that it is in the interest of individuals that a 
group have the right to enjoy an irreducibly collective value, such as the value of group 
dignity. Our associative relations – the particular way in which we have been socialised 
– are that which make it intrinsically valuable to us that the group enjoy dignity. 
We can finally conclude, then that if there is to be a successful defence of a right to 
collective self-determination that could justify a discretionary right to exclude, it must 
involve the wholesale rejection of moral individualism (or the abandonment of 
‘humanism’, although I take it this is an even more costly way out). Our ‘liberal 
individualist’ target can thus be characterised as those theorists who endorse moral 
individualism, or, like Pevnick and Wellman, deny moral individualism although they 
are theoretically prohibited from doing so. Without rejecting moral individualism, one 
would not be able to assert an intrinsically (rather than an instrumentally) justified right 
to self-determination, and thus one would not be able to assert a discretionary right to 
exclude. If one offered an instrumental justification for the right to self-determination, 
then one would have to show that immigration was a threat not just to self-determination, 
but to the underlying values that self-determination serves. And if one is not willing to 
accept the existence of irreducibly collective values, then it can always be the case that 
the value of entry to the individual migrant could outweigh the value of self-
determination to the individual SD-group member.  
76 
 
As we have seen, the individualist theorists’ arguments have been liable to collapse into 
something similar to either communitarianism or liberal nationalism. This precarity 
provides evidence for the thesis that moral individualism is incompatible with a defence 
of a right to collective self-determination that includes the right to exclude. If Wellman 
can demonstrate no objective link between the individual’s freedom of association and 
the state’s, then he would have to make do with a subjective link. This would essentially 
be a communitarian position: it would be to say that citizens have been socialised to feel 
as if the state acts for them, and thus they regard the state’s rights as important in the 
same way as their own. Pevnick, meanwhile, required an “associative” explanation for 
the group right to property in state institutions. Asserting that we acquired property as a 
corporate entity, involves asserting first that we are a corporate entity, in a way that is 
explanatorily prior to the act of acquisition itself. Thus we would need a prior reason to 
regard the group as constituting such an entity, which would most easily be achieved 
through an ascriptive definition of the group, through certain criteria for nationhood, 
for example. Ernest Renan famously argued the nation was a ‘daily referendum’18 – this 
idea is precisely what Pevnick would need as a substitute for the voluntaristic element in 
his story. 
Why then do Pevnick and Wellman fail to recognise that the denial of associativism, 
the assertion of irreducible collective rights, and ‘humanism’ (in Raz’s sense) form an 
inconsistent set of propositions? One explanation might be an equivocatory 
understanding of the term ‘irreducible’. If a group of friends each contribute £100,000 
to purchase a house, they have an “irreducible” collective right to it, insofar as there are 
several of them and only one house, so they must decide as a group how authority over 
it is to be distributed. Yet if those friends each contribute £3 to purchase a pizza, their 
right is collective to the same extent, but they quickly divide the pizza up and privately 
consume their own slice. In other words, being practically unable to reduce a collective 
property claim to individual claims, is not the same as there being no principled sense 
in which the group right can be regarded as an amalgamation of individual rights. 
Pevnick’s position implies regarding our property right in state institutions in this first 
sense. Wellman’s stance, similarly, it not so much that the state’s right to freedom of 
association is irreducible, but that he is unable to find a suitable reductive explanation. 
He simply proceeds as though there is one, although no satisfactory story is given. Even 
                                                 
18
 ‘un plébiscite de tous les jours’, Renan 1882 27 
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if it is true that we owe respect to the individuals who are ‘able and willing to perform 
the requite political functions’ of maintaining a state that adequately protects rights, and 
thus we must forbear from interfering with the state in certain ways, to grant the state a 
right to freedom of association is to do something much more than merely show respect 
for individuals. It is completely obscure why one should entail the other. Indeed, it is 
not clear this respect can ground any of the group rights commonly associated with 
collective self-determination or sovereignty. Yet the fact Wellman even attempts to 
make such a link demonstrates the extent to which he is constrained by his individualist 
stance. 
Where does this leave theorists who wish to justify a right to exclude by means of a right 
to collective self-determination? If they embrace a communitarian solution, they must 
also embrace a strong form of moral particularism. For most liberal theorists, the 
abandonment of moral universalism would be too great a cost. “Liberal nationalism” 
can be viewed as a less radical form of particularism, more acceptable to the 
contemporary mainstream. Yet in watering down the “particularity” of the value of 
exclusion, one also dilutes the strength of the group’s claim to control borders. On 
Walzer’s account, communities of character are an intrinsically valuable collective good, 
thus the weight of reasons on the side of the group’s claim is essentially immeasurable 
from the perspective of an outsider. On David Miller’s account, meanwhile, culture is 
an instrumental collective value: it is valuable because it is a source of identity, because 
it creates the conditions for stable political relations, and so on. That is not to say that 
any culture will do just as well – the value of culture certainly has a particularistic 
component – but Miller accepts it does need to be weighed against the interests of 
immigrants on a case by case basis to determine whether exclusion is justified. Because 
I have said nothing to detract from such arguments, it remains an open question whether 
states ought to pursue the policy of open borders. Yet I hope I have cast doubt on the 
idea that actual contemporary states ought to be able to pick and choose whether and 
which migrants they admit, on the basis of a conception of “collective autonomy” that is 
compatible with a liberal individualist perspective.  
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